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FIDUCIARY IDEOLOGY IN TRANSACTIONS 
AFFECTING CORPORATE CONTROL 
Victor Brudney* 
T HE fiduciary role in which corporate insiders
1 are cast in their 
dealings with, or affecting, their corporations embraces a mul-
titude of parts. Hence the range of restrictions on their conduct 
varies from inhibitions as rigorous as those imposed on express 
trustees to limitations almost as flexible as those governing arm's 
length dealings among strangers. As has often been pointed out, 
the characterization of a corporate officer, a director, or a person 
controlling the corporation as a "fiduciary" does not define his 
status with precision; rather, it sets a tone to his role and suggests 
the existence of obligations and of special sanctions for their en-
forcement. 2 The actual restrictions on, or prescriptions for, the fidu-
ciary's conduct in any particular context are to be found more in 
the reasons for characterizing him as a fiduciary in that context 
than in any rules or articulated proscriptions derived from the mere 
fact of such a characterization. 
For almost two generations it has been suggested, with increasing 
frequency, that the powers of management or of controllers of pub-
lic corporations are exercisable in a fiduciary capacity, not merely 
for their stockholders, but also for a wide variety of other consti-
tuencies-labor, suppliers, consumers, and the community or na-
tion at large. With that view and the debate attending it we are 
not presently concerned. Whatever may be the nature and source 
of management's obligations to other constituencies, our interest 
here is with its fiduciary responsibility to its stockholders. 
In that context, the fiduciary responsibility of an officer or director 
• Professor of Law, Rutgers University; Member of the New York Bar.-Ed. 
1. "Insiders" and "control" are terms of considerable elasticity. At a minimum, 
however, the former includes executive officers, directors, and holders of stock who 
are able to exercise control or a controlling influence on the conduct of a corpora-
tion's affairs. ·while "control" and "controlling influence" are concepts which vary 
with the context, see 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION ch. 5 (2d ed. 1961); Comment, 
The Meaning of "Control" in the Protection of Investors, 60 YALE L.J. 311 (1951), 
they mean no less than possession of the power to direct or cause the direction of 
a corporation's operations and policies, whether through ownership of securities, 
occupancy of office, or directorship, with no practical chance of reversal. See SEC 
Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230. (1964). 
2. In Mr. Justice Frankfurter's classic formulation: 
But to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to 
further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as 
a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations? And 
what are the consequences of his deviation from duty? 
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943). 
[259] 
260 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 65:259 
attaches as a concomitant of his selection by the stockholders to repre-
sent them in managing their investment. Because the power over their 
investment thus delegated to him is representational, the duties he 
owes and the restrictions to which he is subject in his dealings with 
respect to their "property" are rooted in the law of agency and the 
law of trusts, which govern comparable representational relation-
ships.3 To be sure, persons whose controlling position is attributable 
to their mvnership of a significant block of stock do not, like officers 
or directors, acquire their power over the investment of the other 
stockholders as designated representatives of the latter. But their 
power to direct the use of, and to exploit, assets in which the other 
stockholders have substantial economic interests is no less than that 
of persons who are only officers or directors. Hence, although the 
analogy is strained, courts of equity have historically seen fit to 
restrict controlling stockholders' power by reference to the restric-
tions they had developed for trustees and agents faced with conflicts 
of interest.4 
At the heart of the matter is the lack of identity between the 
economic interests of those who control corporations while owning 
only a portion, or none, of the equity and the economic interests 
of the mvners of the equity. This lack of identity of interest 
permits the controlling group to obtain for itself two distinct 
kinds of rewards from its direction of corporate affairs. One re-
sults from the economically successful operation of the corpora-
tion's business and takes the form of a derivative benefit-a return 
on the investment and an increment in the value of both the enter-
prise's assets and the stockholders' equity. This reward is enjoyed 
by all stockholders, including, but not in any disproportionate 
measure, those of the controlling group of stockholders. The other 
reward is a direct benefit to the insiders stemming from the use of 
3. To suggest such roots for the obligations of management or controlling stock-
holders to public stockholders is not, of course, to say that directors are technically 
agents or that controlling stockholders are technically trustees. 
4. Although the duties and obligations of trustees and agents originate in con-
sensual arrangements, they are not entirely a function of consent. The law of trusts 
and of agency might have left the scope of the trustee's loyalty (the restrictions on 
his conduct in the event of conflicts of interest or diversity of aims) to the parties 
to define in the same manner in which the arrangements were created-by express 
provision in the instrument of trust or agency. Instead, presumably in deference to 
the absence or remoteness of the principal or to his inability to police the conduct 
of the agent or the trustee in handling the property placed in bis control, fiduciary 
duties were fashioned by the courts, essentially from prevailing conceptions of desir-
able behavior in handling or dealing with property of others in such circumstances. 
Formulation of general standards and their application in concrete cases are left 
largely to the chancellor's conscience, which plainly permits shifting the balance of 
the competing values from generation to generation. 
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the corporation's assets or facilities in such a way as to compensate 
disproportionately those in control.5 These direct benefits consist 
not merely of private payments or uses which are readily found to 
be unlawful, but also of emoluments which either are lawful or 
whose lawfulness is not policed or readily determinable.6 It is to 
prevent insiders from taking advantage of their strategic position in 
order to obtain, or maximize, such direct benefits for themselves 
that fiduciary restrictions (occasionally categorical, but more often 
selective)7 are imposed on insiders' exercise of their power over 
corporate assets. 
If outside stockholders thus have an interest in how control is 
exercised, which interest is protected against insider abuse by more 
or less rigorous fiduciary standards,8 they have a similarly protec-
5. The myriad modes of unlawfully diverting corporate funds to the private 
benefit of those in control need not be explored here. See, e.g., Hornstein, Corporate 
Control and Private Property Rules, 92 U. PA. L. R.Ev. l (1943); Jennings, Trading in 
Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REv. l (1956). 
6. Along with the conflict over immediate division of corporate revenues (i.e., as 
between dividends and compensation) there may be conflicts as to corporate operat-
ing goals (e.g., depreciation policy, expansion policy, investment in new enterprises) 
when management does not own significant quantities of stock. See Donaldson, Finan-
cial Goals: Management vs. Stockholders, HARv. Bus. REv., May-June 1963, p. 116. 
Moreover, while the governing rules do not permit the controlling group to take 
freely private emoluments from corporate revenues, a large tolerance generally pre-
vails. The lawful, if not entirely legitimate, emoluments of control often include at 
least the upper reaches of a wide range of permissible payments and such collateral 
benefits as may be derived from the powers to direct the use of corporate assets, to 
derive tax benefits, or to take advantage of many kinds of corporation "opportunities." 
This, of course, is entirely apart from the insider's opportunity to exploit his position 
for returns which the law might make him disgorge if his activities were discovered 
in time by persons sufficiently financed and motivated to seek to compel such dis-
gorgement. 
In addition to its economic potential, the power accompanying control of a public 
corporation carries with it prestige, status, and other social or political perquisites 
which various insiders may desire in varying degrees. These concomitants of control 
are not readily split into one for the potential benefit of general stockholders and 
another for potential private benefit. 
7. The fiduciary restrictions are characteristically implemented by attempting 
either (1) to deny categorically, or (2) to offset, the insider's advantages of position. 
The former sanction purports to enforce literally the admonition to single minded 
devotion, and to prevent potential conflict of interest from maturing. It does so by 
prophylactic rules which preclude the insider from assuming a position of conflict 
and make him liable, or accountable for his profits, when he engages in behavior 
which produces the possibility of conflict, regardless of whether in any particular case 
his conduct injures the corporation or its stockholders. The latter, and more gen-
erally invoked, sanction permits the conflict of interest to mature, but under rules 
which are designed to give the beneficiary the minimum protection deemed neces-
sary to offset the advantageous position of the fiduciary, such as the rule that the 
insider must obtain the informed consent of his beneficiary to the proposed activity, 
or that the transaction be "fair," and that, when challenged, the insiders must carry 
the burden of proving that they are not serving their own self interests at the ex-
pense of the corporation or its stockholders. See note 8 infra. 
8. To the extent that necessary or desirable social and economic ends are served 
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tible interest in the determination of where control is located and 
how it may be shifted. It is not necessary to insist that control is 
an "asset of the corporation," or that the non-controlling stock-
holders' interest in the locus of control or in how it may be shifted 
is "property," in order to recognize that the stockholders' vote has 
a value which insiders may curtail or appropriate for their mm 
benefit.9 For example, insiders unilaterally diminish the value of 
the stockholders' vote if they increase their mm proportionate 
voting power by causing the corporation either to issue stock to 
themselves or to purchase the corporation's stock from outsiders. 
They also diminish that value when they use their own assets to 
buy up outsiders' stock. The value of the stockholders' vote is af-
fected when insiders use corporate cash and facilities to solicit 
proxies. And insiders appropriate some portion of that value when 
they sell control.10 In varying degrees, therefore, such efforts by in-
siders unilaterally to preserve or alter control arrangements for their 
o,m benefit and to the possible disadvantage of the other stock-
holders call in to play the insiders' fiduciary role. The problem 
with which the courts have dealt somewhat less than satisfactorily 
is that of defining the limitations which that role imposes in these 
contexts and the consequences which should follow from a failure 
to observe such limitations. 
by permitting direct self-dealing (e.g., the purchase and sale of property, the leasing 
of property, or other transactions between insiders and their corporations or between 
two corporations in which insiders share some interest), the most rigorous fiduciary 
commands have been relaxed. See BERLE &: MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 230-31 (1933). Ideology may categorically forbid a trustee from 
dealing with himself on behalf of the trust, at least without the informed and com-
petent consent of the beneficiaries. REsTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §§ 170, comment h; 
206, comments c-g; 216 (1959). However, accommodation to felt commercial and eco-
nomic needs in corporate enterprise is made by permitting insiders to engage in 
self-dealing, while at the same time, insisting upon protective offsets against the 
potential abuse which such permission includes. The offsets are embodied in the 
requirement of full disclosure of the insiders' interest or other relevant facts, the 
requirement of receipt of approval from the apparently disinterested directors (albeit 
not necessarily the stockholders), and the requirement of "fairness" in the terms of 
the transaction. These requirements can, within somewhat broad limits, be measured 
and enforced. 1 HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 439, 440 (1959); Note, 
61 HARV. L. REv. 335 (1948); cf. Ewen v. Peoria &: E. Ry., 78 F. Supp. 312, 315-17 
(S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
9. See authorities cited note 112 infra; Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 
667 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 941 (1963); Manacher v. Reynolds, 39 Del. 
Ch. 401, 165 A.2d 741 (Ch. 1960); United Funds, Inc. v. Carter, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 
~ 91288 (Md. Cir. Ct., May 16, 1963); Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 285, 
78 N.E. 1090 (1906); Allen v. Chase Nat'l .Bank, 180 Misc. 259, 40 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Sup. 
Ct. 1943). 
10. Compare, e.g., .Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 CoLUM. L. REv. 1212 
(1958), and Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of Corporate Control, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 
628 (1965), with Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARV, L. REv. 986 (1957). 
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I. USE OF CORPORATE AsSETS OR FACILITIES TO .AFFECT CONTROL 
A. Corporate Issuance of Stock to Insiders or Corporate Purchase 
of Stock To Enable Insiders To Strengthen or Retain Control 
Both the issuance of stock to insiders and the purchase by a 
corporation of its own stock raise thorny questions of economic 
abuse of the corporation and the other stockholders because, in 
the former case, the price may unfairly favor the insiders while, in 
the latter instance, the price may unfairly injure either the corpora-
tion and its remaining stockholders11 or the selling stockholders.12 
But apart from the problem of economic abuse,13 a second problem 
. 11. Charges of unfairness to the corporation and the remaining stockholders are 
crystallized in claims that the amount paid per share was more than the fair market 
value of the stock, Mathes v. Cheff, 41 Del. Ch. 166, 190 A.2d 524, 525 (Ch. 1963), 
rev'd, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 194 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Propp v. Sadacca, 40 Del. Ch. 
113, 175 A.2d 33, 34 (Ch. 1961), modified sub. nom. Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 
187 A.2d 405 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136, 138 (Ch. 
1960), or was more than was left, per share, for the outstanding stock, or that 
the corporation had better use for the cash (e.g., as working capital, for future ex-
pansion, as a cushion for senior securities, or debt) than to "shrink" the enterprise 
by buying in its own stock. See, e.g., Mathes v. Cheff, supra, at 176, 190 A.2d at 529; 
Lawrence v. Decca Records, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 424, 195 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
See also Reifsnyder v. Pittsburgh Outdoor Advertising Co., 396 Pa. 320, 326, 152 
A.2d 894, 897 (1959) (Cohen, J., concurring and dissenting). · 
The wisdom, if not the lawfulness, of reposing in a corporation the power to 
purchase its own shares has repeatedly been questioned. See, e.g., Dodd, Purchase 
and Redemption by a Corporation of Its Own Shares: The Substantive Law, 89 U. 
PA. L. REv. 697-98, 706 (1941). Nevertheless, statutes permit such purchases in almost 
all states and prohibit them in none. See Note, Buying Out Insurgent Shareholders 
with Co'rporate Funds, 70 YALE L.J. 308, 320-21 (1960). Furthermore, the practice ap-
pears to be increasingly popular. See Guthart, More Companies are Buying Back 
Their Stock, Harv. Bus. Rev., March 1965, p. 40; Zilber, Corporate Tender Offers for 
Their Own Stock: Some Legal and Financial Considerations, 33 U. CINc. L. REv. 315 
(1964). 
12. Efforts to protect selling stockholders have taken the shape of restrictions on 
corporate repurchase plans and requirements of disclosure to such stockholders of 
relevant facts. See CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. (Transfer Binder) 1111 77354, 91692 (1966). 
See generally Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-IOB-5: An Emerging Remedy for 
Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1149-54 (1950); Note, SEC Action Against 
Fraudulent Purchasers of Securities, 59 HARv. L. REv. 769, 775-78 (1946); Note, The 
Regulation of Corporate Tender Offers Under Federal Securities Law: A New Chal-
lenge for Rule l0b-5, 33 U. CHI. L.R. 359 (1966). Recently the Securities and Exchange 
Commission has suggested (unsuccessfully) that disclosure to the remaining (i.e., 
non-selling) stockholders is an obligation of the insiders seeking to preserve their 
control which must be met before they cause their corporation to purchase its own 
stock. See Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, p. 11-14, O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 
764 (2d Cir. 1964). The suggestion was rejected by the Court. See also Carliner v. 
Fair Lanes, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 25 (D. Md. 1965); Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also note 108 infra. 
13. A requirement of repurchase by call or solicitation of tenders on a pro-rata 
or by-lot basis might remedy many such economic abuses or similar types of un-
fairness, but there is no general requirement of pro-rata or by-lot repurchase, apart 
from the requirements of the New York Stock Exchange, NEW YoRK STOCK ExCH., 
COMPANY MANUAL §§ A-79, -177 (1953), and an occasional prescription in connection 
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is raised in the cases: whether the issuance of stock to insiders or the 
corporate purchase of its own stock should be precluded if the pur-
pose or "primary" purpose of the issuance or purchase is to enable 
the insiders to retain or strengthen their control of the enterprise. 
In dealing with this question, the courts appear to differentiate be-
tween close corporations and publicly held corporations. In the 
latter cases, particularly where corporate purchase of its own stock 
is challenged, the results appear to depend in part on the answer 
to the question of economic abuse, but primarily on the elusive 
answer to the question whether the insiders' motives in seeking to 
retain control were to further the common good rather than simply 
to promote their own private benefit. To rest decision on the in-
siders' motives raises questions as to the propriety of so assessing 
self-serving conduct, even if it is tested by the loosest fiduciary 
standards. 
I. The Case Law: An Overview 
Where the issuance of stock to insiders, as distinguished from 
corporate purchase of its own stock, is challenged,14 the decisions 
rarely reach the question whether the insiders' efforts to preserve 
control are designed to achieve the common good rather than pri-
vate benefit. Instead, the problem is put in terms of whether the 
purpose, or "primary" purpose, or "principal" purpose of issuing 
stock is to affect control.15 If such a purpose is found, the issuance 
is generally proscribed.16 Such a purpose is almost invariably found 
with reduction of capital. Compare General Inv. Co. v. American Hide &: Leather Co., 
98 N.J. Eq. 326, 331, 129 Atl. 244-46 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1925), with Martin v. American 
Potash &: Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 234, 92 A.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. 1952). 
14. Issuance of stock to insiders for purposes of preserving control involves slightly 
different considerations than the doctrine of pre-emptive rights. See Drinker, The 
Preemptive Right of Shareholders to Subscribe to New Shares, 43 HAR.v. L. REv. 586, 
598-99 (1930); Frey, Shareholders' Pre-emptive Rights, 38 YALE L.J. 563 (1929); Morawitz, 
The Preemptive Right of Shareholders, 42 HAR.v. L. REv. 186 (1928); cf. Titus v. Paul 
State Barne, 32 Idaho 23, 179 Pac. 514 (1919). Even when the local corporation statute 
rejects, or is permissive about, and the corporate charter does not provide for, pre-
emptive rights, or indeed, when pre-emptive rights have been waived, courts of equity 
have found no difficulty in invoking the fiduciary concept to preclude such an issuance 
of stock to insiders seeking to affect control. 
15. See, e.g., McPhail v. L. S. Starrett Co., 257 F.2d 388, 394-96 (1st Cir. 1958); Borg 
v. International Silver Co., 11 F.2d 147, 151-52 (2d Cir. 1925); Cummings v. United 
Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 237 Md. 1, 204 A.2d 795 (1964); Dunlay v. Avenue M 
Garage&: Repair Co., 253 N.Y. 274, 170 N.E. 917 (1930); Runswick. v. Floor, 116 Utah 
91, 208 P.2d 948 (1949). 
16. Occasionally courts will intimate that no obligation is owing by directors or 
insiders to other stock.holders with respect to issuance of stock for the purpose of af-
fecting control. State ex rel. Page v. Smith, 48 Vt. 266 (1876) is simply obsolete. See 
also Griffith v. Sprowl, 45 Ind. App. 504, 91 N.E. 25 (1910). In Standard Int'! Corp. 
v. McDonald Printing Co., 159 N.E.2d 822 (Ohio C.P. 1959), when the majority 
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when challenges are made by stockholders of close corporations.17 
In contrast, in cases involving challenges by stockholders of public 
corporations, the tendency is to vindicate the insiders' issuance of 
stock to themselves or to congenial third persons.18 The courts, 
finding that affecting control was not a purpose, or "primary" pur-
pose, of the insiders,19 view as irrelevant the fact that the issuance 
stockholders of a closely-held corporation sold out to a large competitor, the court 
upheld the minority's issuance to itself of enough stock to become a majority. This 
may be a case of judicial assistance to the minority to get the same premium price 
for its stock from the putative buyer of control that the majority had received. See 
Note, 29 U. CINc. L. REv. 264 n.2 (1960). See also Cross v. Farmers' Elevator Co., 31 N.D. 
116, 153 N.W. 279 (1915). In Yasik v. Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 256, 17 A.2d 309, 313 
(Ch. 1941), the court distinguished between the majority stockholder who was losing 
control and small public stockholders, and expressly rejected the notion that the latter 
were owed any obligation with respect to control by an insider who was wresting 
control from a majority stockholder. 
17. E.g., Schwab v. Schwab-Wilson Mach. Corp., 13 Cal. App. 2d 1, 55 P.2d 1268 
(Dist. Ct. App. 1936); Canada So. Oils, Ltd. v. Manabi Exploration Co., 33 Del. Ch. 
537, 96 A.2d 810 (Ch. 1953); Elliott v. Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 80 N.E. 450 (1907); Glenn 
v. Kittanning Brewing Co., 259 Pa. 510, 103 Atl. 340 (1918); Chrisman v. Avil's, Inc., 
80 Pa. D. &: C. 395 (C.P. 1952); Luther v. C. J. Luther Co., 118 Wis. 112, 94 N.W. 
69 (1903). See also Ross Transport, Inc. v. Crothers, 185 Md. 573, 45 A.2d 267 (1946); 
Essex v. Essex, 141 Mich. 200, 104 N.W. 622 (1905); Dunn v. Acme Auto &: Garage 
Co., 168 Wis. 128, 138, 169 N.W. 297, 300 (1918). Some of the cases expressly formu-
late the rule in terms of a prohibition against issuing treasury stock "for the pur-
pose of gaining control of the corporation without giving the other stockholders an 
opportunity to subscribe." E.g., Kullgren v. Navy Gas &: Supp. Co., IIO Colo. 454, 465, 
135 P.2d 1007, 1012 (1943); L. E. Fosgate Co. v • .Boston Mkt. Terminal Co., 275 Mass. 
99, 108, 175 N.E. 86, 90 (1931). And California appears to find the prohibited pur-
pose from the mere fact of a shift in control. Sheppard v. Wilcox, 26 Cal. Rptr. 412 
(Dist. Ct. App. 1963). In other cases, preliminary injunctions are issued pending 
trial. Snelling v. Richard, 166 Fed. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1909). 
The courts are not, however, so firmly attached to the principle prohibiting use 
of corporate facilities to preserve control that they cannot be persuaded on occasion 
to lose sight of it in freeze-out cases. See O'NEAL &: DERWIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION 
OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES 91-98 (1961); Note, 35 N.C.L. REv. 271, 272, 278 (1957). 
18. McPhail v. L. S. Starrett Co., 257 F.2d 388, 395-96 (1st Cir. 1958); Borg v. In-
ternational Silver Co., 11 F.2d 147, 151-52 (2d Cir. 1926); Wyles v. Campbell, 77 F. 
Supp. 343, 351 (D. Del. 1948); Schwartz v. Miner, 37 Del. Ch. 575, 146 A.2d 801 (Ch. 
1958); Cummings v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 237 Md. 1, 15-22, 204 A.2d 
795, 802-06 (1964); Runswick v. Floor, 116 Utah 91, 208 P.2d 948 (1949). See also 
Zweifach v. Scranton Lace Co., 156 F. Supp. 384 (M.D. Pa. 1957). But cf. Kahn v. 
Schiff, 105 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Ohio 1952); Sachs v. Seminole Oil &: Gas Corp., 38 Del. 
Ch. 246, 150 A.2d 20 (Ch. 1959), appeal dismissed, 39 Del. Ch. 73, 159 A.2d 276 (Sup. 
Ct. 1960); Gerlach v. Gillam, 37 Del. Ch. 244, 139 A.2d 591 (Ch. 1958); New Quincy 
Mining Co. v. Johnson, 114 Utah 342, 199 P.2d 561 (1948); State ex rel. Kahn v. 
Johnson, 114 Utah 333, 199 P.2d 556 (1948); Floor v. Johnson, 114 Utah 313, 199 P.2d 
547 (1948); see Yasik v. Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 256, 17 A.2d 309, 313 (Ch. 1941). 
19. The frequency with which such a conclusion is reached casts doubt upon the 
applicability to public corporations of the substantive rule of law developed in the 
cases involving private corporations. In any event, that conclusion is difficult to 
square with the notion that the burden of proof should be on the insiders. Indeed, 
Borg v. International Silver Co., supra note 18, seems to put the burden of proof of 
purpose on the plaintiff rather than on the directors. 11 F.2d at 152. See also Cum-
mings v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., supra note 18, at 24, 204 A.2d at 807; 
McPhail v. L. S. Starrett Co., 157 F. Supp. 560, 563 (D. Mass. 1957). Compare Zweifach 
v. Scranton Lace Co., 156 F. Supp. 384, 397 ~:f.D. Pa. 1957). In contrast, where close 
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of the stock may have some incidental effect on control. The larger 
latitude thus left for insiders of public corporations to issue stock 
to themselves reflects the looser conception of control applying to 
public corporations. But it also reflects accommodation to the dif-
fering needs of the two kinds of enterprises and to the differing 
bases of participation in them. 
For example, issuance of additional stock to one group of par-
ticipants in a close corporation is more likely to be aimed at freezing 
out another faction theretofore participating in control than at 
thwarting an outsider bent on acquiring control. Such a denial or 
curtailment of participation is apt to deprive that faction of its pri-
mary economic interests in the corporation-the compensation its 
members receive and the value of the growth of the enterprise at-
tributable to their contributions to the direction of its affairs. In the 
case of a close corporation, no legitimate commercial or economic 
purpose would be frustrated by a rigid rule precluding insiders from 
purchasing stock from the corporation under any circumstances, re-
gardless of purpose or motive, without first offering other partici-
pants their pro-rata share; it is always feasible for insiders to make 
such an offer, since whatever need the corporation may have for 
the proceeds of the issuance of the stock can be met promptly by 
such an offer or by a loan from the insiders pending the response 
to that offer.20 In contrast, publicly held corporations may require 
issuance of stock to, inter alios, insiders or their friends for legitimate 
corporate purposes (for example, as compensation pursuant to stock 
options, or in mergers or asset acquisitions) which would be frus-
trated if the consent of all the stockholders were required every 
time stock were to be issued for such purposes. 21 
If the cases involving issuance of stock to insiders in order to 
corporations are involved, although on occasion the burden appears to be placed on 
the challenger, Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage & Repair Co., 253 N.Y. 274, 170 N.E. 
917 (1930); cf. Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 236 (Ch. 
1953), the appellate court opinions in most cases do not articulate the problem in 
terms of burden of proof, but rather reflect a ready perception of the forbidden 
purpose as the dominant impulse to action. Indeed, the courts have relatively in-
frequently failed to find such a purpose in cases involving close corporations. See 
Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage & Repair Co., supra; Chapman v. Troy Laundry Co., 
87 Utah 15, 47 P.2d 1054 (1935); cf. Berg v. United Board & Carton Co., 106 N.Y.S.2d 
658 (Supp. Ct. 1951); Note, 35 N.C.L. R.Ev. 271 (1957). 
20. The considerations which argue against pre-emptive rights in the case of 
publicly held corporations, see Drinker, supra, note 14; Morawitz, supra, note 14, 
are not relevant in assessing rules precluding issuance of stock to insiders in private 
corporations. See IsRAEI.S, CORPORATE PRACTICE 104-05 (1963). 
21. It may be noted that even with respect to the issuance of stock to insiders 
of publicly held corporations, a vote of stockholders is often sought or required. 
See, e.g., NEW YORK STOCK EXCH., COMPANY MANUAL §§ A-7, at 118-21; A-15, at 284-85 
(1953); Dean, Employee Stock Options, 66 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 1403 (1953). 
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affect control of close corporations have rarely addressed themselves 
to the question of the insiders' motives in seeking control,22 it is 
because the decisions rest on doctrinal premises which reject the 
relevance of such motives, whether benign or malignant; even be-
nign motivation is not deemed sufficient to justify either the self-
serving issuance of stock by a fiduciary or the frustration of stock-
holder suffrage.23 On the other hand, in the case of publicly held 
corporations, even though at least the consideration of stockholder 
suffrage is applicable,24 in the only express reference to the matter 
found in the cases, the court intimated that motives of public good 
might justify issuance of stock in order to preserve control.25 
When the repurchase of corporate stock by privately held cor-
porations is challenged, the courts have traditionally invoked both 
corporate and trust ideologies to suggest a categorical prohibition 
against the use of corporate funds to purchase stock for the purpose 
22, The cases generally involve a history of sharp disagreement between two fac• 
tions with respect to the operation of the corporation, not infrequently affecting the 
emoluments of control. The courts seek to ascertain whether the issuance of stock 
was required by legitimate corporate needs (to pay off debt, for working capital, etc.), 
and, if so, whether issuance to the insiders without offering it at the same time to 
the other stockholders was similarly a corporate necessity. If either proposition is 
answered in the negative, no legitimate corporate purpose is found to have been 
served by the issuance of the stock to the insiders, and the courts tend to conclude 
that the stock was issued for the purpose of preserving, acquiring or shifting control, 
and that the insider has violated his fiduciary obligation to the stockholders. Often, 
of course, there is extraneous evidence of the forbidden purpose. See, e.g., Sheppard v. 
Wilcox, 26 Cal. Rptr. 412 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Elliott v. Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 80 
N.E. 450 (1907); Glenn v. Kittanning Brewing Co., 259 Pa. 510, 103 Atl. 340 (1918); 
Chrisman v. Avil's, Inc., 80 Pa. D. &: C. 395 (C.P. 1951); cf. Lawrence v. I. N. Parlier 
Estate: Co., 15 Cal. 2d 220, 100 P.2d 765 (1940); Note, 35 N.C.L. REv. 271 (1957). 
23. In Elliot v. Baker, supra note 22, the court stated: 
Mere belief that they are acting for the interests of the corporation . • • docs not 
~ustify the issuing to confederates of a sufficient amount of stock to give to them-
selves, and to oust their opponents from the control of the corporation when 
the issuance of the stock is not required by the condition of the corporation nor 
reasonably necessary for the proper prosecution of its business. 
194 Mass. at 522-23, 80 N.E. at 452. See also Glenn v. Kittanning Brewing Co., supra 
note 22; Sheppard v. Wilcox, supra note 22. In Luther v. C. J. Luther Co., 118 Wis. 
112, 94 N.W. 69 (1903), the court said: 
Nothing can be more fallacious in corporate or in popular government than the 
argument that because they honestly believe their policy right, and another 
dangerous, they may rightfully invade the field of the suffrage upon which policy 
rests, and disenfranchise in whole or in part, those who disagree with them. 
118 Wis. at 124, 94 N.W. at 73. See also Rowland v. Times Publishing Co., 160 Fla. 
465, 471-72, 35 So. 2d 399, 402-03 (1948); Trask v. Chase, 107 Me. 137, 145-46, 77 Atl. 
698, 702 (1910). 
24. Both Borg v. International Silver Co., 11 F.2d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 1926) and 
the court which decided Runswick v. Floor, 116 Utah 91, 97-98, 208 P.2d 948, 951-52 
(1949), see Floor v. Johnson, 114 Utah 313, 199 P.2d 547 (1948), seem to recognize this. 
25. In McPhail v. L. S. Starrett Co., 257 F.2d 388, 395-96 (1st Cir. 1958), the court 
of appeals used strong language suggesting that insiders might properly issue stock 
to themselves in order to frustrate raiders; but the trial court found that such was 
not the sole or even the principal purpose of the issuance of stock in that case. 257 
F.2d at 394. Compare Cummings v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 237 Md. 1, 
19-21, 204 A.2d 795, 804-05 (1964). 
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of effecting control.26 But none of the decisions rests on facts which 
require such a categorical prohibition, and recently a repurchase 
of stock to preserve control was explicitly upheld.27 The cases in-
volving public corporations tend to reject such a categorial pro-
hibition. In Delaware, 28 where the problem appears to have arisen 
with respect to publicly held corporations more often than else-
where, as well as in other jurisdictions,29 insiders are permitted 
26. Thus in Andersen v. Albert & J. M. Andersen Mfg. Co., 325 Mass. 343, 346, 
90 N.E.2d 541, 544 (1950), the court said: 
The acquisition of some of the stock by two of the directors, the purchase of 
the remainder to be held as treasury stock, and the subsequent reduction of the 
number of outstanding shares resulted in ousting the remaining stockholders, 
other than Allen, from the control of the corporation and in transferring control 
to such two directors and Allen. Seventy-five thousand dollars of corporate funds 
were expended in the purchase of this stock. Directors cannot take advantage of 
their official position to manipulate the issue and purchase of shares of the 
stock of the corporation in order to secure for themselves the control of the 
corporation and then to place the ownership of the stock in such a position as 
will perpetuate that control. Such action constitutes a breach of their fiduciary 
obligations to the corporation and a wilful disregard of the rights of the other 
stockholders. 
Similar language may be found scattered in the opinions of a few other courts. See 
Macht v. Merchants Mortgage & Credit Co., 22 Del. Ch. 74, 194 At!. 19 (Ch. 1937); 
Albert E. Touchet, Inc. v. Touchet, 264 Mass. 499, 507, 163 N.E. 184, 187 (1928); 
Petre v. Bruce, 157 Tenn. 131, 136-37, 7 S.W.2d 43, 45 (1928); Gilchrist v. Highfield, 
140 Wis. 476, 478, 123 N.W. 102, 103 (1909). See also Yax v. Dit-Mco, Inc., 366 S.W.2d 
363 (Mo. 1963). 
27. Hendricks, Jr. v. Mill Eng'r & Supp. Co., 413 P.2d 811 (Wash. 1966); cf. Baker 
v. Standard Lime & Stone Co., 203 Md. 270, 100 A.2d 822 (1953). 
28. Mathes v. Cheff, 41 Del. Ch. 166, 190 A.2d 524 (Ch. 1962), rev'd., 41 Del. Ch. 
494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1963). See also Schwartz v. Greene, 39 Del. Ch. 330, 163 
A.2d 614 (Ch. 1960); Healy v. Geilfuss, 37 Del. Ch. 502, 146 A.2d 5, 10 (Ch. 1958), 
appeal dismissed, 40 Del. Ch. 26, 172 A.2d 574 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Propp v. Sadacca, 40 
Del. Ch. 113, 175 A.2d 33 (Ch. 1961), modified sub nom. Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 
14, 187 A.2d 405 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (Ch. 
1960); Martin v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 234, 92 A.2d 295 (Sup. 
Ct. 1952), 35 A.L.R.2d 1140 (1954). 
29. In New York, a lower court ruled in Lawrence v. Decca Records, Inc., 20 
Misc. 2d 424, 425-26, 195 N.Y.S.2d 431, 433-34 (Sup. Ct. 1959), that a cause of action 
cannot be founded upon purchases by a corporation of its stock and its parent's 
stock which "are not attacked as illegal or unauthorized or as poor business judg-
ment exercised fraudulently or in bad faith, but merely to influence control which 
in itself is not actionable, particularly in the absence of any allegation of damage." 
The court went on to state: 
It is not control which injures, but its abuse •••• The object to support control 
cannot buttress a claim of wrong, if control itself is not offending, lacking an 
allegation of its abuse to the detriment of the corporation or to the profit of 
the defendants other than the mere fact of control. 
This ruling was effectively modified by a later decision, Lawrence v. Decca Records, 
Inc., 27 Misc. 2d 445, 203 N.Y.S.2d 225 (Sup. Ct. 1960), upholding, against a motion 
to dismiss, a second amended complaint alleging economic injury to the corporation 
by reason of improvident sales of assets and borrowings in order to obtain cash for 
the corporation to use to purchase its stock in order to preserve control. See also 
Selama-Dindings Plantations, Ltd. v. Durham, 216 F. Supp. 104, 114 (S.D. Ohio 1963), 
afj'd, 337 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1964) (holding that it was appropriate to spend corporate 
funds to investigate an outsider's character and intentions in acquiring corporate 
stock); Reifsnyder v. Pittsburgh Outdoor Advertising Co., 396 Pa. 320, 152 A.2d 894 
(1949) (where a corporation bought its own stock from a controlling person which 
had been ordered to divest itself of control in compliance with the antitrust laws, 
December 1966] Fiduciary Ideology 269 
to cause a corporation to purchase its own stock for the purpose of 
thwarting a shift in control. The propriety of such purchases is said 
to turn on whether the incumbents' effort to retain control is itself 
in furtherance of a legitimate business purpose. The suggestion is 
that if the outsiders seeking control contemplate a program for the 
corporation which will be unlawful or economically harmful, the 
"in" group is justified in using corporate funds to thwart them (at 
least so long as due care is used in the effort), since such a use of 
corporate funds is assumed to be made for the benefit of all in-
vestors and not merely for the preservation of the "in" group's access 
to the emoluments of control. Hence, the decisions appear to turn 
on (I) whether the "prin,cipal" or "primary" purpose of the corpo-
rate purchase was preserving control; (2) whether the insiders' mo-
tives in seeking to retain control were to promote the collective 
good rather than to gain private advantage; and (3) whether proper 
care was exercised in pursuit of those objectives. 
2. Purpose To Affect Control 
The fact that the issuance of corporate stock to insiders or the 
purchase by a corporation of its mvn stock may serve many proper 
purposes not connected with retaining control30 raises the questions 
how significant the purpose to affect control must be and how 
such a purpose must be proved, before the transaction should be 
condemned or its benefits denied to insiders. In close corporations, 
as the cases indicate, it is not difficult to identify a purpose to affect 
control and to assess its significance.31 In public corporations, how-
and the court, in dictum approving the price paid by the corporation, said: "Pitts-
burgh's directors and stockholders felt that they had to purchase this block of con-
trolling stock in order to continue the present management and to prevent an out-
sider or competitor from getting control of the company." 396 Pa. at 324, 152 A.2d 
at 896); see Vulcanized Rubber &: Plastics Co. v. Scheckter, 400 Pa. 405, 413, 162 A.2d 
400, 405 (1960); cf. Allen v. Francisco Sugar Co., 193 Fed. 825, 841 (3d Cir. 1912). 
30. Stock may be purchased, for example, in order to have treasury stock avail-
able for use in satisfying employee stock options, for use in subsequent asset acquisi-
tions, or to reduce total dividends payable. See Guthart, More Companies Are Buy-
ing Back Their Stock, Harv. Bus. Rev., March-April, 1965, p. 40; Zilber, Corporate 
Tender Offers For Their Own Stock: Some Legal and Financial Considerations, 33 
U. C1Nc. L. REv. 315, 316-20 (1964). Hence, in the absence of a rule generally proscribing 
corporate purchase of its own stock on a non-pro rata basis, it is necessary to determine 
first whether a purpose or "primary" or "principal" purpose of the transaction is 
to affect control. 
31. See notes 17, 22 &: 26 supra. This determination in stock purchase cases is 
presumably to be made by the same kinds of inquiries into the asserted non-elec-
toral purposes to be served by purchasing the stock as in stock issuance cases. See 
note 22 supra. Compare, e.g., Gilchrist v. Highfield, 140 Wis. 476, 478, 123 N.W. 102, 
103 (1909), with Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (Ch. 1960), and Mathes 
v. Chelf, 41 Del. Ch. 166, 190 A.2d 524 (Ch. 1962). See also Borden v. Guthrie, 23 
App. Div. 2d 313, 260 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1965); Reifsnyder v. Pittsburgh Outdoor Ad-
vertising Co., 396 Pa. 320, 152 A.2d 894 (1959). 
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ever, the problem is more complicated. Mixed purposes are apt to 
be claimed, and in many cases there may be great difficulty in de-
termining whether affecting control was an incidental effect rather 
than a purpose of the action, or whether it was a "dominant" or 
"primary" purpose rather than merely a lesser factor. 
When corporate repurchase of stock is involved, there appears 
to be less basis for argument as to purpose than when new stock is 
issued, since either the elimination of a visible "raider" tends ob-
viously to transcend any other possible or assertable business pur-
pose for the repurchase, or the effect of a purchase program on 
retention of control appears to be immaterial and incidental.32 
When issuance of new stock is involved, however, purposes not 
involving control may loom larger, since the issuance produces cash 
or other assets which are generally demonstrably necessary or use-
ful to corporate operations; hence, "non-control" purposes can not 
be as readily relegated to the category of "merely incidental." Strict 
fiduciary considerations would make any such legitimate business 
purpose irrelevant, and would presumably condemn the transac-
tion, or at least deny the insider its benefits, because it constitutes 
a unilateral disadvantageous alteration of the stockholders' interest 
in control arrangements, although its purposes and effects may 
be substantially beneficial to the stockholders. But the categorical 
prohibition of such action which strict fiduciary standards sug-
gest has been rejected because corporate action uninspired by a 
design to alter the control mechanism for the insiders' benefit is 
often independently desirable despite incidental effects on control. 
Examples of such transactions are the issuance of stock under bona 
fide stock option plans33 or in bona fide asset acquisitions.34 Conse-
quently, a selective proscription operates; only those transactions 
which are found to serve primarily the purpose of affecting control 
are singled out. 
In cases dealing with public corporations, the decisions acknowl-
edging the general principle that transactions which are intended 
primarily to affect control are proscribed leave much to be de-
32. See Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Kors v. 
Carey, supra note 31. But cf • .Borden v. Guthrie supra note 31; Reifsnyder v. Pitts-
burgh Outdoor Advertising Co., supra note 31. 
33. See McPhail v. L. S. Starrett Co., 257 F.2d 388, 395-96 (1st Cir. 1958); Schwartz 
v. Miner, 37 Del. Ch. 575, 146 A.2d 801 (Ch. 1958). 
34. See Zweifach v. Scranton Lace Co., 156 F. Supp. 384 (M.D. Pa. 1957); Cummings 
v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 237 Md. 1, 204 A.2d 795 (1964); cf. Mac-
Crone v. American Capital Corp., 51 F. Supp. 462, 469-70 (D. Del. 1943). Compare 
the charges and explanations in full page advertisements in the New York Times, 
May 19, 1966, p. 75, and May 20, 1966, p. 69, soliciting votes with respect to the 
request of Loews, Inc., management for stockholder approval of an increase in the 
number of authorized shares of the corporation's common stock. 
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sired, in part because of the terms in which the courts formulate 
the rule,3is but more significantly because the application to spe-
cific facts appears to be eroding the principle. Although the 
courts' opinions occassionally purport to deny it, their decisions 
suggest that they have placed on the challengers the burden of 
establishing the primacy of the self-serving purpose rather than 
requiring the insiders to negate such a purpose. Placing this burden 
on the challengers is incompatible both with traditional fiduciary 
obligations when loyalty is questioned and with the insiders' su-
perior ability to explain their purpose.36 Thus, for example, the 
timing of a stock option plan, or the permissible allocations or 
actual issuance of stock under the plan, may be affected by a de-
sign to preserve control although the basic notion of adopting such 
a plan and the essential contours of the plan can be shown to have 
been a reasonable response to the need to keep key personnel. 
Similarly, the legitimate ends to be served by a particular merger 
or asset acquisition may be clearly demonstrable, while its terms, 
such as the issuance of some stock in lieu of cash, or the allocation 
of stock among particular participants, may be designed to serve 
the control aspirations of insiders. In such circumstances, fiduciary 
considerations would deny insiders the personal benefits they seek 
unless they can demonstrate the primacy of external business pur-
poses, or po~sibly even the immateriality37 of self-serving purposes. 
Insiders are in a better position than are the challengers to produce 
all the facts and to explain the significance of the various factors 
considered in deciding upon the transaction, and the benefit of the 
doubt is traditionally accorded to beneficiaries when fiduciaries 
enter into self-serving transactions with their trust. 
Moreover, placing the burden of proof on the insiders would 
not be incompatible with any demonstrated business needs. To be 
35. While some courts state that the purpose to affect control must be the "pri-
mary" purpose of stock issuance in order to condemn the transaction, Cummings v. 
United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., supra note 34, others have suggested that con-
demnation is to be withheld unless the purpose to affect control is the "sole" pur-
pose of stock issuance, Borg. v. International Silver Co., 11 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1926); 
Wyles v. Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 343 (D. Del. 1948); cf. McPhail v. L. S. Starrett Co., 
257 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1958). Moreover, even when legitimate business purposes are 
shown to have been the "primary" purposes, the purpose to preserve control may 
have been "material," in the sense that it was necessary and was taken into account 
in delineating the terms or boundaries of the transaction. Cf. Cummings v. United 
Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., supra note 34, at 29-30, 204 A.2d at 810 (Horney, J., 
dissenting); In re Seminole Oil & Gas Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 246, 150 A.2d 20 (Ch. 1959). 
To the extent of any such "taking into account," there is occasion for invoking the 
condemnatory principle. 
36. See, e.g., Ross Transp., Inc. v. Crothers, 185 Md. 573, 45 A.2d 267 (1946); notes 
42 & 44 infra. 
37. See note 35 supra. 
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sure, such an allocation of the burden may have some discouraging 
effects on the incumbents' willingness to chance proposals which 
might be economically advantageous, and the question may fairly be 
asked whether that result will outweigh the benefits to be derived 
from preventing improper perpetuation of insiders' control. The 
short answer is that, in the vast bulk of cases, management can recog-
nize, and therefore act, when external business purposes are plainly 
predominant or when control-preservation purposes are plainly not 
material to a stock issuance or repurchase. It is only in the doubt-
ful case that the problem exists. There is no way of knowing how 
extensive such cases may be, although it is worth noting that a com-
parable uncertainty with respect to the "fairness" of many types 
of self-dealing transactions has not prevented management from 
acting on them. In the absence of empirical evidence to the con-
trary, there is little reason to doubt that the risk of harm from insti-
tutionally perpetuating the incumbents' grip on control outweighs 
any risk that economically desirable transactions will be discouraged 
by placing the burden of proof where it traditionally belongs-on 
the self-serving fiduciary. 
3. Justification for Seeking To Retain Control 
Once it is found that the purpose for a corporation's issuing or 
purchasing its stock is to preserve insiders' control, the questions 
arise whether any such purpose can ever be justified, and, if so, 
when it is justified. 
As has been cogently demonstrated elsewhere,38 the analysis in 
the Delaware cases dealing with publicly held corporations, which 
is cast in terms of assessing whether those seeking to preserve 
their control are motivated by private benefit or common good, . 
is hardly adequate to test the propriety of such a use of corporate 
funds. Whatever may be said in justification of the elusive30 distinc-
tion between personnel and policy to support the expenditure of 
corporate funds on behalf of management in the course of a policy 
38. Buying Out Insurgent Shareholders With Corporate Funds, 70 YALE L.J. 308 
(1960). 
39. The ease with which personal motives can become policy reasons is suggested 
by the advice of the Prentice-Hall Corporation Service after reporting the decision 
of the Supreme Court of Deleware in Chelf v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 
(Sup. Ct. 1964): 
WHAT TO DO ---- The case gives an important guideline. Make sure 
you can show you acted in good faith to preserve corporate interests. In addition 
to your own investigation, get competent professional advice to support your be-
lief that the acquisition by outsiders would be a threat to the corporation. 
P-H CoRP. SERv., Bull. No. 23, 1[ 23.1, May 6, 1964; cf. Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 
52, 158 A.2d 136, 141 (Ch. 1960). 
December 1966] Fiduciary Ideology 273 
dispute in a proxy contest,40 the fact that insiders disagree with 
"raiders" over an issue of policy is not alone, as the courts appear 
to recognize, sufficient to justify the expenditure of corporate funds 
to prevent a contest for control. When the stockholders' voting power 
is thus being thwarted by use of corporate funds, the courts require 
that there be some showing that the insiders have a reasonable basis 
to believe that the activities contemplated by the outsiders would 
be either harmful to the corporation or unlawful. The resulting 
emphasis in the opinions on whether the insiders reasonably could 
fear that the outsiders' alleged policies would injure the corpora-
tion and whether the funds are appropriately used to avert such 
injury tends to focus attention on the insiders' duty of care rather 
than on their duty of loyalty. The extent to which the courts de-
cline to view the matter as a question of loyalty is underscored by 
the fact that, even in the one case holding the insiders at fault, the 
decision rested on a finding that they were imprudent in causing 
the corporation to pay too high a price for its stock by running up 
the bids in market purchases, rather than that they were seeking to 
protect their enjoyment of the private benefits of control.41 Hence, 
although as a formal matter the Delaware courts appear to place 
the burden of justification upon the insiders,42 their decisions and 
a recent Washington decision43 suggest that, in accordance with 
their understanding of the issue as one of care rather than loyalty, 
they are applying the business judgment test to measure the pro-
priety of the insiders' behavior.44 The Delaware courts appear not to 
40. See notes 72-74 infra and accompanying text. 
41. See Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (Sup. Ct. 1962). 
42. The Delaware courts proclaim that the governing substantive rule frowns upon 
corporate purchases of its own stock, that permissible purchases are the exception, 
and that the burden of justifying such use of corporate funds is on the directors. 
See Chelf v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 504, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Sup Ct. 1964); Bennett 
v. Propp, supra note 41, at 18, 187 A.2d at 409. But cf. Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 
54, 158 A.2d 136, 141-42 (Ch. 1960); Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 
6, 99 A.2d 236 (Ch. 1953). 
43. Hendricks, Jr. v. Mill Eng'r & Supp. Co., 413 P.2d 8ll (Wash. 1966). 
44. See Note, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 302 (1965); cases cited note 42 supra. See also 
Zweifach v. Scranton Lace Co., 156 F. Supp. 384 (M.D. Pa. 1957); Carliner v. Fair 
Lanes, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 25, 29 (D. Md. 1965). Compare Lawrence v. Decca Records, 
Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 424, 195 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup. Ct. 1959) with Lawrence v. Decca 
Records, Inc., 27 Misc. 2d 445, 203 N.Y.S.2d 225 (Sup. Ct. 1960). But cf. Sachs v. 
Seminole Oil & Gas Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 246, 150 A.2d 20 (1959). Compare Krieger 
v. Anderson, 40 Del. Ch. 363, 367, 182 A.2d 907, 909 (Sup. Ct. 1962). Relieving 
the "disinterested" directors in Chelf v. l.lathes from the burden of proof and re-
lieving most of the "disintereted" directors in Bennett v. Propp from liability, sug-
gest a distinction between the test for such directors (business judgment) and the 
test for interested directors (loyalty). See 78 HARv. L. REv. 1253 (1965). The actual 
decisions in those two cases do not, however, apply the distinction. In the former 
case, the decision exonerated both the interested and disinterested directors alike, ex-
pressly deciding that the interested directors acted in good faith and were not to be 
penalized for an honest mistake of judgment. In the latter case, one of the disin-
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have been struck by the incongruity of applying a standard de-
signed to vindicate the exercise of business judgment in non-conflict-
of-interest situations as a measure of compliance with the duty of 
loyalty, which arises only in conflict of interest situations.45 
However, the objection to the Delaware decisions is not simply 
that they measure the propriety of insiders' behavior by a standard 
of "fairness" which appears inevitably to offer the incumbents still 
another mode of access to the corporate till in order to preserve 
their control. The primary question is whether a prophylactic 
sanction should be invoked to preclude all such issuance or pur-
chase of stock for the purpose of preserving control. The courts' 
refusal to provide such a sanction rests on entirely erroneous sub-
stantive premises as to corporate suffrage. The Delaware opinions 
are grounded on the assumption that it is proper for management, 
and ultimately the courts, to decide in advance that the outsiders 
will gain control and that the activities contemplated by them will 
be so harmful from a business standpoint46 or of such questionable 
legality47 as to justify both the economic cost of thwarting their 
attempt (the issue price to insiders or the expenditure of corporate 
funds) and the denial to the stockholders of the opportunity to vote 
on whether they would authorize outsiders to undertake such ac-
tivities. However, it is one thing to conclude on the basis of the 
actual conduct of corporate affairs and demonstrated economic 
results that those in charge have illegally milked the corporation, 
othenvise misconducted themselves, or managed the enterprise in-
efficiently and unsuccessfully. It is quite another thing to form such 
terested directors was, in fact, not exonerated. In any event, it is not necessary to 
underscore the fact that the distinction between "interested" and "disinterested" 
directors is less than sharp. See 50 CORNELL L.Q. 302, 308-09 (1965). 
45. See :Bayne, The Fiduciary Duty of Management-The Concept in the Courts, 
35 U. DET. L.J. 561 (1958). Courts measuring insiders' behavior by trust ideology 
addressed to the duty of loyalty may proscribe prophylactically conduct which might 
· be supported by a business judgment test. Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389, 
397 (6th Cir. 1954). Certainly when a fiduciary's motives are challenged as being 
self-serving, room may not be left for wide business judgment even by "disinterested" 
directors. Cf. Fogelson v. American Woolen Co., 170 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1948). 
46. E.g., that the corporation would be adversely affected among its customers 
if its reputation for high quality products were diluted by association with a pur-
veyor of lower quality products, that, if a controlling interest in the enterprise were 
acquired by one customer, the latter would be improperly favored and other cus-
tomers would be scared off, Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (Ch. 1960), or 
that the corporation's mode of marketing its product would be disadvantageously al-
tered, Mathes v. Chelf, 41 Del. Ch. 166, 190 A.2d 524 (Ch. 1962). 
47. E.g., that the relationship between the controlling person and the corpora-
tion might violate the Robinson-Patman and Clayton Acts, Kors v. Carey, supra note 
46, at 50-51, 158 A.2d at 139-40, or that the controlling person might merge the 
corporation into itself on terms which were less favorable than could be obtained 
at arm's length, Martin v. American Potash &: Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 234, 92 A.2d 
295 (Sup. Ct. 1952). 
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a conclusion on the basis of predictions by interested witnesses as 
to what policies outsiders will follow if they get control, and to 
decide that other possible uses of corporate funds are less desirable 
than their use to prevent the acquisition of control by persons who 
may commit acts which may be unlawful or economically disad-
vantageous if they acquire control.48 
In fiduciary terms, it is incongruous to vest insiders with any 
discretion to use the corporate machinery to issue stock to them-
selves or to use corporate cash to buy its stock in order to increase 
their proportionate voting power and perpetuate their control. It 
is not merely that they thus advantage themselves in self-dealing or 
self-serving transactions; it is equally significant that the propriety 
of the price paid turns on a relatively flexible estimate of fairness, 
and that the corporate necessity for such action turns on a no more 
precisely assessable estimate of the nature, wisdom, and propriety 
of the future conduct of outsiders. In such kinds of self-dealing-
where both the opportunity and the temptation to benefit the 
trustee are large and where there is no way of assessing effectively 
whether the beneficiary is deprived of anything-fiduciary ideology 
suggests a prophylactive prohibition, or at the very least requires 
the informed consent of the beneficiaries.49 While corporate consid-
erations often override such strict fiduciary in junctions, no over-
riding corporate needs are present when the transaction is intended 
to increase or perpetuate the insiders' control. On the contrary, 
corporate norms support fiduciary norms in rejecting both the pre-
emptive issuance of stock to insiders and the purchase of corporate 
stock to preserve control. No corporate ends are served by such 
conduct other than those said to result from preserving the insiders' 
control. If such control is sought for private benefit, the preferen-
tial increase of the insiders' voting power offends even the narrowest 
conception of stockholder rights. If control is sought to be retained 
for the common benefit (to fend off "raiders" who have possibly 
harmful intentions), such augmentation of insider voting power 
offends the basic assumption underlying the stockholders' right to 
48. Fenestra, Inc. v. Gulf Am. Land Corp., 377 Mich. 565, 141 N.W.2d 36 (1966). 
It is instructive to compare the charges against the raider made by the incumbents 
in Mathes v. Chelf, for the purpose of justifying their use of corporate cash to beat 
off the raider with management's own performance in directing the affairs of that 
company. See Chelf v. Schnackenberg, 382 U.S. 917 (1965); 50 CORNELL L.Q. 302, 306 
(1965). 
49. Cf. Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 273 (1951). It may be noted that to the 
extent that the "fairness" of the issue or purchase price depends on a prediction that 
the outsiders will get control and an assessment of what they will do to the corpora-
tion if they get control, it is considerably less measurable than the "fairness" of 
the price paid for goods, or even services, in the typically permitted instances of 
self-dealing. 
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vote-that they have the power to determine who is to manage 
corporate operations for the common benefit. 
To be sure, the adequacy of stockholder suffrage as a mode of 
allocating power over the varied constituencies served or "gov-
erned" by a modern, publicly held corporation has been questioned 
repeatedly.rm It has been urged that, ideally, stockholders should be 
given a smaller voice and other constituencies a larger voice in the 
process by which management is legitimated. But whatever may be 
the validity of such arguments, there is little to support, and much 
to oppose, any suggestion that when those in control are challenged 
by outside stockholders the insiders should be authorized to deter-
mine or affect the legitimacy of their own tenure by diluting stock-
holder suffrage through the exercise of their power over the corpo-
rate machinery or assets. By the same token, while the normal 
ineffectiveness of public stockholders' votes evidences the dismal, if 
inevitable, disparity between doctrine and reality with respect to 
stockholder suffrage even in the case of moderate-sized corporations, 
it is no cure to permit the incumbents to tighten their long-range 
grip on control by use of corporate facilities or assets. 
Indeed, the erosion of suffrage is underscored when the dilution 
or curtailment of the vote occurs in the face of a challenge by out-
siders which creates one of the few occasions when public investors' 
votes are likely to be effective. Organized and potent opposition 
which can offer a choice to stockholders does not inevitably arise 
when existing management is inadequate. But application of the 
pejorative term "raider" to outsiders should not mask the facts that 
inadequate management invites such opposition and that "raiders" 
can have the same interest as public investors in enhancing the value 
of the corporate stock.51 So long as stockholder voting is the pre-
scribed mode for legitimating management, it is preferable to facili-
tate opportunities for a stockholders' choice in such matters, and, 
therefore, for the governing rules to forbid the use of corporate 
assets or facilities by insiders to prevent or frustrate the exercise of 
50. See BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY (1959); MAsoN, THE CORPORATION IN 
MODERN SOCIETY (1959); REUSCHLEIN, THE SCHOOLS OF CORPORATE REFORM (1950); Gower, 
Book Review of Emerson 8: Latcham, Shareholder Democracy, 68 HARV. L. REv. 922 
(1954); Manning, Book Review of Livingston, The American Stockholder, 67 YALE L.J. 
1477 (1958). 
51. See McCARTHY, ACQUISmONS AND MERGERS 257 (1963); :MASON, op. cit. supra 
note 50, at 46-72. The later history of the Holland Furnace Company, the corporation 
involved in Chelf v. Mathes, suggests that the public stockholders could not possibly 
have been any worse off if the raider had acquired control. See 50 CORNELL L.Q. 302, 
306 n.29 (1965). See also Barnhill, The Corporate Raider, 20 Bus. LAw. 763 (1965). For 
discussion of a comparable effort to solve the so-called problem of the raider in Britain, 
see Penrose, Some Aspects of the Development, Criticism and Control of the Take-Over 
Bid, Since 1945, 1964 JURID. REv. 128. 
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such a choice.112 Hence, even when it appears probable that the out-
siders contemplate unwise or unlawful actions, those in control have 
no ·writ to use corporate facilities to impose their benevolent pro-
tection, at least if their doing so rests on their own unmeasurable 
estimate of the future behavior of others and at the same time 
effectively denies to stockholders the right to express a preference 
for one management over another. 
This suggested prohibition is not inconsistent with the duty 
which a controlling stockholder may have, when selling his invest-
ment, to prevent control from passing to persons whose intent to 
injure the corporation is, or should be, foreseeable.53 That obliga-
tion exists because the controlling person is getting out of the enter-
prise and is shifting control by a transaction in which, by definition, 
the remaining stockholders have no voice. When he thus acts alone 
he has a duty to guard the interests of the remaining stockholders. 
However, when they have the opportunity to protect their own 
interests by the use of their voting power, his fiduciary duty neither 
requires nor permits him to deny them that opportunity or to dilute 
their right of choice. 
4. Stockholder Ratification 
A categorical prohibition against the use of corporate assets for 
the purpose of preserving control would deny to stockholders the 
power to permit such a use of assets except by unanimous consent. 
This suggestion is not incompatible with statutes which provide that 
less than all the stockholders have the power to approve the issuance 
of stock to insiders or the purchase of stock by the corporation, 
or that specified majorities of the stockholders may amend the 
charter, even to the extent of diluting or diminishing their voting 
power.114 Such statutory power in a majority to curtail its mm voting 
potential does not necessarily mean that the majority can donate a 
portion of the minority's interest in the vote to insiders in order 
to perpetuate the latter's control. In corporate law, as elsewhere, 
compliance with statutory requirements may be a necessary, but 
not a sufficient, condition to valid action. Overriding criteria of 
52. This is not to say that public investors have a right, either in fiduciary or in 
corporate terms, to be offered a contest for control every time a dissident faction 
appears, or that every control contest is desirable. Indeed, some are costly and some 
may be injurious to the corporation. But, when outsiders make substantial invest-
ments in stock in order to seek control, they are not likely to be merely nuisance 
claimants. They are presumably raising serious, and possibly substantial, issues. 
53. See note 113 infra. 
54. See, e.g., Maddock v. Vorclone Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 39, 147 Atl. 255 (Ch. 1929); 
Morris v. American Pub. Util. Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Atl. 696 (Ch. 1928); Note, 54 
HARV. L. R.Ev. 1368 (1941). 
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"fairness" or "good faith" still have to be met.55 Informed stock-
holder approval, even by statutorily prescribed majorities, of an 
issuance of new stock or a corporate purchase of old stock would 
presumably not validate such action if the price were so unfair as 
to amount to a gift of corporate assets to, or for the benefit of, the 
insiders.56 Appropriation of a portion of the stockholders' interest 
in control by altering the amount of outstanding stock to favor the 
insiders may be no less a gift to them, and consequently it cannot 
be ratified by less than unanimous, informed stockholder approval. 
The cases dealing with close corporations recognize this principle 
quite regularly, perhaps because the relationship between stock-
holder suffrage and the protection of essential economic interest 
is apparent in this context since the complainant is likely to have 
been deprived by the defendants of a significant voice in control 
and a significant share of the emoluments of control. The tenuous-
ness of the relationship between individual small stockholders' votes 
and their economic interest in the identity of the management of a 
publicly held corporation might explain, but cannot justify, the 
courts' failure to invoke the same requirement of stockholder action 
in the case of publicly held corporations. 
Even if, as has been suggested, 57 it were appropriate to put 
before stockholders for a majority vote the question of issuing or 
buying stock to fend off raiders, it may be noted that this appears 
never to have been done. While federal securities legislation may in-
duce some such submissions, it has not yet required them.58 More-
55. E.g., Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912); Kerbs v. 
California E. Ainvays, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652 (Sup. Ct. 1952), 34 A.L.R.2d 
839 (1954); Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Remil-
lard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (Dist. 
Ct. App. 1952); Page v. American & British Mfg. Co., 129 App. Div. 346, 113 N.Y. 
Supp. 734 (1908). See also State ex rel. Waldman v. Miller-Wohl Co., 42 Del. 73, 28 
A.2d 148 (Super. Ct. 1942). Compare United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Prods., Inc., CCH 
FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 91288 (Md. Cir. Ct., May 16, 1963); cases cited note 14 supra. 
For the literature and cases on the question of a requirement of "fairness" when 
fundamental changes are submitted for vote by statutory majorities, see Note, 69 
HARV. L. REV. 538 (1956). 
56. See cases cited note 55 supra. 
57. See Note, 70 YALE L.J. 308, 318-20 (1962); McPhail v. L. S. Starrett Co., 257 F.2d 
388, 394 (1st Cir. 1958); cf. Krieger v. Anderson, 40 Del. Ch. 363, 182 A.2d 907 (Sup. Ct. 
1962). But cf. Gilchrist v. Highfield, 140 Wis. 476, 123 N.W. 102 (1909). 
58. Recent decisions under federal securities legislation suggest that disclosure of 
control aspirations may be a mode of implementing insiders' fiduciary obligations 
when stock is issued to them. Compare Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d 
Cir. 1964), with McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 834 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
368 U.S. 939 (1961). See generally Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assess• 
ment, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1146 (1965); Israels, Corporate Purchase of Its Own Shares-
Are There New Overtones?, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 620 (1965); Note, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 
359 (1966). However, in the context of corporate purchase of stock to affect control, 
there is considerable uncertainty as to the scope, and indeed the meaning of the 
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over, as a pracd .al matter, if a market purchase program is planned 
in order to frustrate raiders, advance authority is not likely to be 
sought from stockholders because to do so would be so time-con-
suming and would have such an inflationary impact on the price of 
the stock as to threaten the success of the program. On the other 
hand, if stockholder approval is sought after the purchases are made 
on the market, or even before such purchase if the payment of funds 
is made to buy out the potential raider rather than to buy stock on 
the market, no issue remains be~veen the raider and the old manage-
ment to submit to the stockholders. 59 The intrinsic limitations on 
the kind of information which would be disclosed in any solicita-
tion of proxies to obtain approval of such corporate expenditures 
suggest that an informed vote could not be had on the question. 
Hence there is no basis for depriving stockholders of the more 
conventional opportunity to choose the management they prefer 
by substituting therefor contests over whether to authorize a corpora-
tion's issuance or purchase of its stock for the purpose of perpetuat-
ing the incumbents' control. 60 
disclosure requirement, except perhaps for the proxy regulations. See Studebaker 
Corp. v. Allied Prods. Corp., 256 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Mich. 1966). Whatever may be the 
insiders' duty of disclosure to the sellers, federal securities legislation appears to 
have created no comparable duty to the corporation and its remaining (i.e., non-
selling) stockholders when insiders cause the corporation to buy in its stock. O'Neill 
v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964); Carliner v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 25 
(D. Md. 1965); Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). To find a duty of 
disclosure to the corporation and its remaining stockholders in the federal securities 
legislation raises myriad other problems. Recognition of some of the difficulties in-
volved is explicitly given in the brief of the SEC (p. 14) in O'Neill v. Maytag, where, 
in arguing that insiders should be required to disclose their purpose to affect control 
when they cause a corporation to repurchase its securities at a price which is alleged 
to be too generous to the sellers, the Securities and Exchange Commission has stated: 
'Where, ... persons who represent a corporation in a securities transaction par-
ticipate with the other party to that transaction in a scheme to defraud their 
corporation, it is not entirely clear what disclosures and to whom would 
suffice to eliminate the fraud. The question may be largely academic since 
normally concealment of a scheme to defraud from those in a position to do any-
thing about it is of the essence of the scheme. In any event, it seems unnecessary 
to consider this question here since, at least at the present stage, there is no 
suggestion that the alleged fraud was disclosed to anyone not a party to the 
alleged scheme. 
59. See Note, 70 YALE L.J. 308, 318-19 (1962). 
60. A contest between outsiders and insiders over approval of the issuance or 
purchase of stock, see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52(c) (1965), might not present to the 
stockholders the same issues as a contest for office. Thus, recently the management of 
Loews, Inc., sought stockholder approval for a "package" transaction consisting of 
a 2-for-l stock split and an authorization of additional shares which management 
might use to purchase diversified properties from friendly sellers and at the same 
time strengthen its control. See note 34 supra. The dissidents, challenging the manage-
ment's efforts thus to acquire additional potential support, were hampered by the 
fact that the vote for creation of additional stock was to be cast as part of a vote 
for a stock split which most stockholders would find highly attractive. Apart from 
the possibility of thus confusing voters or slanting the vote, the fact that the timing 
of such a vote would be within the control of the incumbents would presumably 
favor them. 
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5. Injuries and Remedies 
When a corporation is caused to repurchase its stock in order 
to preserve insiders' control, challenges of the repurchase present 
not only the problem of establishing a wrong,61 but also the problem 
of prescribing a remedy. 62 The complaint generally alleges economic 
injury to the corporation resulting from an expenditure of funds 
which is claimed to be unlawful in purpose and therefore waste-
ful, and economic relief is thus generally sought.63 As we have noted, 
the courts have posed the question in terms of whether the expendi-
ture is economically justifiable and have tested the propriety of 
the insiders' conduct by the business judgment standard. 64 If, by 
the application of that test, no overall economic injury is found, 
the courts are hard put to recognize, or to fashion relief for, the 
residuary claim that the public investors' voting power has been 
altered to their disadvantage.65 Adherence to the notion that it is 
the insiders' loyalty rather than their business judgment which is 
challenged, and which they must vindicate, would facilitate the use 
of suggested economic remedies. 66 While such remedies may not 
61. The fact that the complainant is simply a small investor who has not himself 
been deprived of control has been deemed sufficient to deprive him of standing in 
cases involving public corporations, See Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 57, 158 A.2d 
136, 142 (Ch. 1960); Yasick v. Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 17 A.2d 309 (Ch. 1941). But cf. 
Healy v. Geilfuss, 37 Del. Ch. 502, 510-11, 146 A.2d 5, 10 (Ch. 1958), appeal dismissed, 
40 Del. Ch. 26, 172 A.2d 574 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Matter of Caplan, 20 App. Div. 2d 301, 
246 N.Y.S.2d 913, afj'd, 14 N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908 (1964). 
62. The problem of an appropriate remedy is generally not serious in the case 
of issuance of stock to insiders, since either cancellation of the stock or rescission are 
readily available remedies. See, e.g., Sachs v. Seminole Oil &: Gas Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 
246, 150 A.2d 20 (Ch. 1959); Andrew v. Albert&: J. M. Andersen Mfg. Co., 325 Mass. 
343, 90 N.E.2d 541 (1950); Glenn v. Kittanning Brewing Co., 259 Pa. 510, 103 Atl. 
340 (1918); Floor v. Johnson, 114 Utah 313, 322-24, 199 P.2d 547, 551-52 (1948). 
63. See, e.g., Mathes v. Chelf, 41 Del. Ch. 166, 167-69, 190 A.2d 524, 525 (Ch. 1963); 
Propp v. Sadacca, 40 Del. Ch. 113, 114-16, 175 A.2d 33, 34 (Ch. 1961); Kors v. Carey, 
39 Del. Ch. 47, 50-51, 158 A.2d 136, 138 (Ch. 1960); Healy v. Geilfuss, 37 Del. Ch. 
502, 510-11, 146 A.2d 5, 10 (Ch. 1958); Lawrence v. Decca Records, Inc., 27 Misc. 2d 
445, 203 N.Y.S.2d 225 (Sup. Ct. 1960). Compare Cummings v. United Artists Theatre 
Circuit, Inc., 237 Md. 1, 204 A.2d 795 (1964). 
64. See notes 42 &: 44 supra and accompanying text. 
65. See, e.g., Martin v. American Potash Co., 33 Del. Ch. 234, 92 A.2d 295 (Sup. 
Ct. 1952); Lawrence v. Decca Records, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 424, 195 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup. 
Ct. 1959). Compare Healy v. Geilfuss, 37 Del. Ch. 502, 146 A.2d 5 (Ch. 1958). In Kors 
v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (Ch. 1960), the corporation profited by purcha~e 
of its stock in view of a later price rise, even though the purchases were made at prices 
in excess of the market price at the time of purchase. See also Chelf v. Mathes, 41 
Del. Ch. 494, 502-03, 199 A.2d 548, 553 (Sup. Ct. 1964). 
66. See Note, 70 YALE L.J. 308, 317-18 (1960). As the facts in the Delaware cases 
suggest, generally more will have been paid by the corporation in purchasing its stock 
than a willing buyer would have paid a willing seller on the public market. See 
Mathes v. Chelf, 41 Del. Ch. 166, 190 A.2d 524 (Ch. 1963); Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. 
Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Kors v. Carey, supra note 65. This excess is a 
minimum measure of the economic cost to the corporation of the insiders' desire to 
retain control for themselves. To that extent at least, compliance with fiduciary stan-
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re-establish the prior balance of voting power in particular cases, 
they are likely to have a deterrent effect in the generality of cases: 
But even if the challenge seeks only to vindicate political claims, 
that is, to rectify the contraction of the public stockholders' voting 
power rather than to recoup for economic injury, there is no reason 
to dismiss the challenge. An insider is no less in violation of his 
fiduciary duties when he curtails the stockholders' interest in the 
mobility of control arrangements than when he inflicts demon-
strable economic harm. And, political remedies are available. Al-
though courts are reluctant to remove directors for abuse of their 
office, and often are said to be powerless to do so in the absence of 
statutory power, statutes in some states authorize such removal, 67 
and common law decisions suggest, even if they rarely hold, that 
such power exists, at least in the case of fraud. 68 Moreover, the 
failure to disclose in proxy materials that a corporation's issuance 
or purchase of its stock is to be made or has been made in order to 
avoid a contest or to enable management to prevail in a contest may 
be sufficiently misleading so as to constitute a violation of the Se-
curities Exchange Act and the proxy regulations. An election in 
which proxies so obtained are used is sufficiently tainted so as to 
justify removal from office of those elected. 69 There is certainly 
a legitimate basis for urging that directors who so acquire their 
tenure hold it no more properly than do persons who have pur-
chased office or have corrupted stockholders' votes, and that there-
fore the directors should be removed and declared ineligible while 
a new election is conducted.70 To be sure, such removal would not 
restore to the public stockholders the potential for change repre-
dards would require them to make the corporation whole, even if, as in Kors v. Carey 
and Cheff v. Mathes, the stock subsequently increased in price. Another suggested eco-
nomic remedy is to cause the insider to purchase the stock from the corporation at a 
price equal to the price theretofore paid by the corporation or the market price at 
the time when the insider must purchase, plus interest, whichever is higher. 
67. See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS§ 187, at 438-39 (1946 ed.); 2 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA 
OF CORPORATIONS § 358 (1954); e.g., CAL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 811; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw 
§ 706(d). See also Investment Company Act § 36, 54 Stat. 841 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
36 (1964). 
68. See Brown v. North Ventura Road Dev. Co., 216 Cal. App. 2d 227, 232, 35 Cal. 
Rptr. 568, 571 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); California Fruit Growers Ass'n v. Superior Court, 
8 Cal. App. 711, 97 Pac. 769 (Dist. Ct. App. 1908); Nahikian v. Mattingly, 265 Mich. 
128, 1!15, 251 N.W. 421, 424 (1933); Hollander v. Breeze Corp., 131 N.J. Eq. 585, 26 
A.2d 507 (Ch. 1941), aff'd, 131 N.J. Eq. 6UI, 26 A.2d 522 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1942). 
69. See Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules in the Courts, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1041, 1072-83 
(1960). Action by a private stockholder under J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 
(1964), may be the means for seeking such redress. 
70. Wyatt v. Armstrong, 186 Misc. 216, 59 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1945). The power 
of courts to review corporate elections has been invoked in related contexts. Sachs v. 
Seminole Oil &: Gas Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 246, 150 A.2d 20 (Ch. 1959); Floor v. Johnson, 
114 Utah 313, 322-24, 199 P.2d 547, 551-52 (1948). 
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sented by the outsiders who were eliminated by a controlling stock-
holder, and it might not even restore the control arrangements 
which have been altered. Indeed, there may be little stimulus for 
a stockholder to seek to vindicate merely his political rights if no 
economic remedy is available.71 But judicial sterility in creating 
remedies should not be an added deterrent to the stockholder. 
B. Use of Corporate Funds in Proxy Solicitations 
The :fiduciary and corporate considerations which suggest the 
impropriety of the issuance of stock to insiders, or of the use of 
corporate funds to purchase stock in order to preserve the incum-
bents' control are also relevant to the expenditure of corporate funds 
to solicit proxies on behalf of management. To be sure, such a 
use of corporate funds is presumably designed to furnish, rather than 
to deny, the stockholders the opportunity to exercise their suffrage. 
In addition, such expenditures in proxy contests do not perma-
nently alter the voting structure; they merely help to preserve the 
incumbents' control in a particular election. Nevertheless, control 
so preserved is more likely to be continuous than merely temporary, 
and such a use of corporate funds thus effectively curtails, rather 
than enlarges, stockholders' opportunities to choose management. 
These realities are not altered by the judicially created doctrine 
which purports to confine the insiders' use of corporate funds in 
proxy solicitation to the illumination of questions of "policy" 
(which presumably serves the good of all stockholders), and which 
denies such a use of funds when only questions of "personnel" are 
at issue.72 This distinction between issues of "policy" and issues of 
"personnel" has been recognized by the courts, even as they have 
invoked it, to be a virtually useless device for separating permissible 
from impermissible corporate expenditures.73 Such expenditures 
have rarely, if ever, been disallowed on the ground that the dispute 
71. Derivative litigation which offers little hope of any immediate cash return is 
hardly likely to be undertaken, even by a substantial stockholder. 
72. Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 81, 171 Atl. 
226, 227 (Ch. 1934); Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine &: Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 
128 N.E.2d 291 (1955); Grodetsky v. McCrory Corp., 267 N.Y.S.2d 356, 49 Misc. 2d 322 
(Sup. Ct. 1966). See generally authorities collected in ARANow &: EINHORN, PROXY CoN-
TESTS FOR CORPORATE CoNTil.OL chs. 20-22 (1957). As the authors indicate, the outer 
limits of permissible expenditures are unclear, largely because of the uncertainty as to 
whether the premise on which expenditures are authorized is (I) only to enable stock.-
holders to be informed with respect to the matters at issue; or (2) also to permit them 
to be persuaded to vote for one side or the other. 
73. Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Hall v. Trans-Lux 
Daylight Picture Screen Co., supra note 72, at 81, 171 Atl. at 227; see .ARANOW 8: 
EINHORN, op. cit. supra note 72, ch. 21. But cf. Cullom v. Simmonds, 285 App. Div. 
1051, 139 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1955). 
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is purely a matter of "personnel."74 Hence, notwithstanding am-
biguities in some of the decisions, any detached assessment of the 
law in operation impels the conclusion that insiders are in fact 
allowed to use corporate money and facilities in proxy solicita-
tion to protect their own access to the private emoluments of con-
trol, even though the "rule" by which this result is achieved does 
not contemplate, and indeed purports to prohibit, such use. 
Strict fiduciary standards would categorically preclude insiders 
from spending corporate funds to perpetuate their power, wh~ther 
they are deemed fiduciaries for stockholders alone or for several 
constituencies. And as a corporate matter, the fact that a proxy con-
test is over issues of policy does not, a priori, justify the use of cor-
porate funds by management to solicit proxies for itself in order to 
legitimate its control. It would be equally reasonable to forbid cor-
porate funds from being used in a campaign to preserve control 
and to require those whose economic interests are presumably most 
affected by the adoption of one policy rather than another-e.g., 
the stockholders-to use their own funds to underwrite the proxy 
campaign. In any event, it is theoretically possible to require rele-
vant information to be furnished to stockholders without at the 
same time soliciting proxies,75 although, practically, the relevant 
information is likely to favor management. But apparently in recog-
nition of the public stockholders' limited financial interest in rela-
tion to the cost of proxy solicitation and in deference to the need 
to raise a quorum,76 courts have accepted the notion that, in both 
74. The unlikelihood of any such disallowance is increased by the New York de• 
cisions placing the burden of proof on the outside challenger, which makes it virtually 
impossible for an insider's expenditures to be found improper. See Rosenfeld v. Fair-
child Engine &: Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955). 
75. Compare Securities Exchange Act § 14(c), 78 Stat. 570 (1964), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) 
(1964); SEC Reg. 14A, Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.Ha-10, -11 (1964, Supp. 1966). 
Commentators and others have suggested that even if proxies are solicited, the mate-
rials to be sent to stockholders should be rigidly confined to relevant factual informa-
tion, and that expenditures for persuading as distinct from informing should be 
disallowed. See Emerson &: Latchman, Proxy Contest Expenses and Shareholder De-
mocracy, 4 W. REs. L. REv. 5 (1952); Friedman, Expenses of Proxy Contests, 51 CoLUM. 
L REv. 951, 954-55 (1951); cf. Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine &: Airplane Corp., supra 
note 74, at 176-87, 128 N.E.2d at 295-301 (Van Voorheis, J., dissenting); Lawyers Adver-
tising Co. v. Consolidated Ry. Lighting &: Refrigerating Co., 187 N.Y. 345, 80 N.E. 
199 (1907). It may be noted, however, that such relevant information will undoubtedly 
be cast in a form which favors management so that the incumbents will inevitably 
derive substantial advantage from the use of corporate funds and facilities to circu-
late such information. 
76. See EMERSON 8: l.ATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY 141 (1954); L!vINGSTON, THE 
AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER (1958). It may be noted, however, that recently the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit has suggested "that in contests for control the manage-
ment has a role to play as such and not merely insofar as the managers are stock-
holders," so that it is entitled to use corporate funds to perpetuate itself in order to 
frustrate outside stockholders' desires. Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 695 
(2d Cir. 1966). 
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management controlled and stockholder controlled enterprises, cor-
porate funds may properly be used to solicit management proxies 
on matters of policy. Here, as elsewhere, fiduciary considerations 
have yielded to alleged corporate needs-the assumed desirability, 
if not the demonstrated necessity, of sending proxy solicitation ma-
terials to stockholders in order that they be fully informed on mat-
ters of corporate policy with respect to which they have the right 
to vote.77 
The factors which are felt to justify the overriding of strict 
fiduciary injunctions against permitting insiders to use corporate 
assets for their own benefit suggest narrow limits to insiders expendi-
tures which, as we have noted, courts do not appear to find easily 
enforceable. But, whether or not such limits are enforced, the same 
factors suggest that the inevitable advantages accruing to insiders 
from such access to corporate funds should be diluted, if they cannot 
be entirely offset, by facilitating the expression of the views of 
those opposing the incumbents. When rigid fiduciary restrictions are 
relaxed to permit insiders to deal with their corporations, stock-
holder protection demands full disclosure and "fair" terms. Simi-
larly, giving insiders access to corporate funds to solicit proxies on 
matters of "policy" requires making available equal access to such 
funds and facilities for those challenging management on matters 
of "policy." 
The case law is sparse in this area and does not extend beyond 
suggesting that successful insurgents (possibly only with stockholder 
approval) and unsuccessful incumbents may be reimbursed from 
the corporate till.78 Moreover, to conclude that such reimbursement 
is a permissible corporate expenditure is not to say that it is a right 
of the recipients.79 No statement or holding by a court or the 
Securities and Exchange Commission has yet gone as far as the 
proposals by commentators that "meritorious" but unsuccessful 
insurgents should be reimbursed, not merely as a privilege, but as a 
matter of right.80 Nevertheless, such reimbursement would be con-
77. The New York Stock Exchange requires listed companies to agree to solicit 
proxies for all meetings of stockholders and therefore to furnish the information re• 
quired under § 14 of the Securities Exchange Act in proxy soliciting material. NEW 
YORK. STOCK EXCH., COMPANY MANUAL § A-134 (1953). 
78. Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Rosenfeld v. Fairchild 
Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955); cf. Cullom v. Simmonds, 
285 App. Div. 1051, 139 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1955). 
79. Cf. Grodetsky v. McCrory Corp., 267 N.Y.S.2d 356, 49 Misc. 2d 322 (Sup. Ct. 1966). 
80. Indeed, at least one case has rejected such a view, Phillips v. United Corp., 5 
SEC Jud. Dec. 445, Civ. No. 40-497 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), appeal dismissed, 171 F.2d 180 (2d 
Cir. 1948). See also Grodetsky v. McCrory Corp., supra note 79. But see, Campbell v. 
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sistent with, if it is not compelled by, the basic notion that if stock-
holders should underwrite the expense of receiving management's 
views, they should also pay the cost of circulating the opposition's 
views because such views are no less relevant than are management's 
to the choice which stockholders are entitled to make in' a contest 
over control. 
Uprisings of small stockholders are not a predictable result of 
giving outsiders contesting control access to corporate funds, even if 
it were desirable to encourage such attempts at Jeffersonian democ-
racy in corporate enterprise. At best, opposition will succeed only 
where it originates with relatively large aggregations of capital. 
Such stockholder voting arrangements may not be the wisest mode 
for determining where corporate power shall reside, and they cer-
tainly do not offer the most effective method of assuring manage-
ment responsibility. But so long as stockholder suffrage provides 
the predominant machinery for effectuating such purposes, and so 
long as it remains impossible to deny management access to the 
corporate till in order to favor itself-however lightly81-in the 
solicitation of votes, the advantages of such self help can at least be 
mitigated by also making that· source available to outside opposi-
tion. 82 
Loew's, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (Ch. 1957); Emerson & Latcham, Proxy 
Contest Expenses if Shareholder Democracy, 4 W. R.Es. L. REv. 5, 15-17 (1950); Fried-
man, supra note 75. See also authorities discussed in ARA.Now & EINHORN, op. cit. supra 
note 72; FEUER, PERSONAL LIABILITIES OF OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 119-21 (1961). Compare 
the suggestion that management proxy materials carry nominations made by outside 
stockholders. Caplin, Proxies, Annual Meetings and Corporate Democracy, The Lawyer's 
Role, 37 VA. L. REv. 653 (1951). 
81. See note 75 supra. 
82. Whether the availability of such a subsidy would unduly drain the corporate 
treasury or otherwise injure the corporation or the attractiveness of its stock for in-
vestors depends largely upon the kinds of contestants who would be eligible for the 
subsidy and the kinds of contests in which the participants would be eligible for the 
subsidy. Proxy contests are not ipso facto beneficial to public investors. And not all 
initiators of proxy contests seek the common good. On the other hand, more is in-
volved than simply initiating a derivative suit or offering a proposal to be included in 
management's proxy statement. It is unlikely that mere nuisance contests will be 
started, particularly if funds must first be spent, if judicial or administrative approval 
must be obtained before there is reimbursement, or if not all contestants may auto-
matically expect reimbursement from the corporation. Development of suitable cri-
teria of eligibility for subsidy undoubtedly presents knotty problems, particularly 
since the opposition need not be confined to a single group, but may be splintered. 
But several feasible suggestions have been made for such criteria and for their im-
plementation by the Securities and Exchange Commission. See EMERSON & LATCHAM, 
SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY 142 (1954); Emerson & Latchham, Proxy Contest Expenses 
and Shareholder Democracy, 4 W. R.Es. L. REv. 5 (1952); Friedman, supra note 75; 
Note 61 YALE L.J. 229 (1952). The difficulty of drawing an appropriate line is cer-
tainly not of sufficient magnitude to preclude a rule authorizing subsidization of 
meritorious, if unsuccessful, opposition. 
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C. Indemnification for Litigation Expenses 
Incurred in Contests for Office 
[Vol. 65:259 
Somewhat different from the problems generated by the use of 
corporate funds in proxy contests are the issues raised by the use of 
corporate funds to indemnify or reimburse directors and others £or 
the cost of litigation challenging their right to hold office or pressing 
others' claims to office. Little judicial light illuminates this area. 
In the absence of statute or corporate by-law, a few courts have 
either declined to authorize reimbursement when there was no 
demonstrable pecuniary benefit to the corporation, or have tended 
to invoke a distinction between the personal interests of the liti-
gants in the controversy and the corporate interest in the integrity 
of its internal processes.83 This distinction is reminiscent of the 
distinction between personnel and policy which is invoked in 
measuring the propriety of the expenditures of corporate funds in 
proxy contests, but it is even less tenable as a tool £or separating 
permissible from impermissible reimbursement £or the costs of 
litigating title to office than it is as a measure of the legitimacy of 
proxy contest expenses. 84 Hence it is not surprising that the distinc-
tion is ignored in those decisions which suggest that reimbursement 
from corporate funds (pursuant to indemnification statutes, con-
tracts, or other arrangements) can be offered to directors who pre-
vail in the litigation challenging their status,85 and to outsiders suc-
cessfully litigating their right to office.86 
83. See, e.g., Burley Tobacco Co. v. Vest, 165 Ky. 762, 178 S.W. 1102 (1915); Schindel 
v. Brenauer, 136 N.J. Eq. 94, 40 A.2d 631 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1945); Hull v. Enoch 
Morgan Sons, 2 N.Y. City Ct. Rep. 69 (1884). See also Reifsnyder v. Pittsburgh Outdoor 
Advertising Co., 405 Pa. 142, 147-49, 173 A.2d 319, 322 (1961); Comment, Corporate 
Responsibility for Litigation Expenses of Management, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 104, 109 
(1952); cases collected in Annots. 39 A.L.R.2d 580 (1955); 152 A.L.R. 909 (1944). 
84. A controversy over title to corporate office is addressed to legal questions con-
cerning the functioning of the corporate elective process rather than the wisdom of 
particular policies or the competence or integrity of particular personnel. See notes 87 
&: 88 infra. 
85. See Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Automatic Steel Prods., Inc., 39 Del. Ch. 371, 
164 A.2d 437 (Ch. 1960), 75 HARv. L. R.Ev. 623 (1962), relying upon a statutory and 
by-law right to indemnification. Compare Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen 
Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 87-88, 171 Atl. 226, 230 (Ch. 1934); Central Shorewood Bldg. 
Corp. v. Saltzstein, 245 Wis. 138, 13 N.W .2d 525 (1944). 
86. See Richman v. DeVal Aerodynamics, Inc., 40 Del. Ch. 548, 185 A.2d 884 (Ch. 
1962); Mencher v. Sachs, 39 Del. Ch. 366, 164 A.2d 320 (Sup. Ct .. 1960); Runswick v. 
Floor, 116 Utah 91, 100, 208 P .2d 948, 953 (1949), all involving corporate elections 
plus a determination that certain corporate action affecting control (such as issuance 
of stock to insiders or their friends, or entry into management contracts) should be 
altered or stayed. The Delaware decisions imply that the recipient's right to reimburse-
ment (if not also the corporation's right to proffer it) rests on the benefits conferred 
upon the corporation by the judicial resolution of the collateral issues. See also 
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Whether corporate payment of such litigation expenses is as 
incompatible with fiduciary standards as is payment of manage-
ment's expenses in proxy contests, corporate considerations would 
more easily support a conclusion favoring such payments in the 
former case than in the latter. Concern with validating the corporate 
electoral process and with legitimating its office holders87 offers 
reasons to permit the corporation (as distinguished from the sup-
porting stockholders) to pay management's litigation expenses, rea-
sons which are lacking for its payment of the cost of management's 
proxy solicitations.88 Moreover, interest in the legitimacy of corpo-
rate office argues for also indemnifying the unsuccessful incum-
bents80 and the challengers, so long as they have put forward "meri-
Bosch v. Meeker Co-op. Light &: Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W .2d 423 (1960); 
In the Matter of Caplan (Lionel Corp.), 20 App. Div. 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Sup. Ct. 
1964), afj'd, 23 App. Div. 2d 655, 257 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1965); Allen v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 
180 Misc. 259, 40 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Note, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 843 (1960); 
cases collected in Annot. 39 A.L.R.2d 580, 587-88 (1955). 
87. See Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Automatic Steel Prods., Inc., 39 Del. Ch. 311, 
378-79, 164 A.2d 437, 441-42 (Ch. 1960); Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen 
Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 88, 171 Atl. 226,230 (Ch. 1934). But cf. note 83 supra. 
88. Cf. Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., supra note 87, at 88, 
171 Atl. at 230. In proxy contests, the assumption is that essentially political or policy 
questions are being debated and that the stockholders are required to subsidize such 
a debate in order to be able to vote more intelligently. However, in litigation over 
tenure of office, no money is being expended for the purpose of informing stock-
holders with respect to any action they should take. The expenses are undertaken to 
inform the court and to enable it, rather than the stockholders, to act correctly in 
resolving legal questions. Indemnification or reimbursement of contestants for their 
costs in such litigation is more aptly analogized to payment of costs of parties to 
litigation producing a benefit for the corporation. The concept "benefit" embraces 
not merely the creation of a trust fund or pecuniary benefit, but also the effectuation 
of the corporate processes of election and the legitimitizing of the occupants of 
corporate office. See Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 
CoLUM. L. REv. 784, 799 n.100 (1939), for cases authorizing compensation for non-
pecuniary benefits. Compare Bosch v. Meeker Co-op. Light &: Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 
362, 101 N.W. 423 (1960); Martin Foundation, Inc. v. Phillips-Jones Corp., 204 Misc. 
120, 123 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Sup. Ct. 1953), modified, 283 App. Div. 729, affd, 306 N.Y. 972, 
120 N.E.2d 229 (1954); Note, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 843 (1960). Cases are collected in 39 
A.L.R.2d 580, 587-88 (1955). 
89. Loss of such litigation is most likely to be on non-negligence, non-fault grounds 
when there is a contested election or an effort to remove a director without cause. 
It is doubtful that the indemnity would apply if the directors' claims to offices are 
based on what is found to have been their misconduct, see Bailey v. McLellan, 159 
F.2d 1014 (1st Cir. 1947); Chabot &: Richard Co. v. Chabot, 109 Me. 403, 84 Atl. 892 
(1912), or are frivolous, since such claims could be deemed to be wrongfully or negli-
gently asserted, and therefore to disentitle the directors to indemnity, cf. Essential 
Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 343, 355-57, 182 A.2d 647, 655 (Ch. 1962); 
WASHINGTON &: BISHOP, INDEMNIFYING THE CoRPORATE EXECUTIVE 15-16 n.24 (1963). 
Certainly, a director who is unsuccessful in meritorious litigation over his tenure of 
office is no less entitled to reimbursement for his expenses than is a trustee for ex-
penses incurred in litigation over the propriety of his conduct, as long as his actions 
do not constitute active misconduct or actual fraud. In re Carter's Estate, 6 N.J. 426, 
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torious"90 contentions. To be sure, the language of most statutes, 
by-laws, and contracts providing for indemnification may not cover 
challengers who were not directors or officers when they incurred 
the expenses for which they seek reimbursement.91 Nevertheless, the 
cases intimate that successful challengers may properly cause the 
corporation to reimburse them or may request the court to make 
appropriate compensation to them on grounds other than a statu-
tory or contractual right to indemnification.92 Occasionally, in cases 
involving close corporations, the courts have allowed all parties to 
be reimbursed for the costs of litigation challenging tenure of office, 
at least when the losing party was not entirely unsuccessful.93 Com-
pensation to successful or partly successful challengers or incum-
bents rests on the same principles which permit compensation 
of counsel for plaintiffs in derivative litigation brought for the 
collective benefit of all stockholders.94 Even when the challenger or 
incumbent is not at all successful, if his claims were meritorious so 
that factual problems and legal issues of significance to corporate 
suffrage or control were resolved, the grounds that support payment 
of "watchdog" compensation to unsuccessful contenders in many 
reorganization proceedings95 suggest compensating him in contests 
for office irrespective of such rights as he may have under indem-
nification statutes or by-laws. 
In sum, if fiduciary considerations are not weighty enough to 
preclude the use of corporate funds on behalf of management in 
proxy contests or to reimburse incumbents in litigation over con-
test results, the corporate considerations thus impelling the relaxa-
tion of fiduciary commands suggest that the same source of funds 
be made available to outsiders in order to offset the advantages of 
such relaxation. 
446, 78 A.2d 904, 915 (1951); Behrman v. Egan, 31 N.J. Super. 95, 106 A.2d 36 (Ch. 
1953), modified, 16 N.J. 97, 106 A.2d 284 (1954). 
90. The determination of when claims are sufficiently "meritorious" to justify re-
imbursement of expenses presents fewer difficulties than does the determination of 
when unsuccessful opposition in proxy contests may appropriately be reimbursed, 
since assessment of compensable litigation expenses turns on much narrower inquiries 
-inquiries into the merits of legal claims and facts relevant thereto-which are 
within the daily competence of courts and administrative agencies. 
91. See Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Automatic Steel Prods., Inc., 39 Del. Ch. 371, 
378-79, 164 A.2d 437, 441 (Ch. 1960); WASHINGTON &: BISHOP, op. cit. supra note 89, at 
17-18. 
92. See note 86 supra. 
93. Marron v. Wood, 55 N.M. 367, 233 P.2d 1051 (1951); cf. Grant v. Hartman 
Ranch Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 497, 14 Cal. Rep. 531 (1961). 
94. See note 88 supra. 
95. In re United Corp., 119 F. Supp. 524, 532-33 (D. Del. 1954); In re Engineers 
Pub. Serv. Co., 116 F. Supp. 930 (D. Del.), afj'd, 221 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1953). 
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II. UsE OF INSIDERS' REsoURcEs To AFFECT CONTROL 
A. Purchase of Stock by Insiders from Outsiders or on the Market 
Apart from efforts to affect control by using corporate assets or 
facilities in which other stockholders have an interest, insiders may 
also seek to 1:se their own resources to protect their control, such as 
by purchasing stock on the open market, or from outsiders who are 
seeking to take over, or from other insiders who are leaving. Are 
such purchases, which do not involve either self-dealing or self-
serving transactions utilizing corporate assets but which do involve 
a unilateral alteration of relative voting power, governed by fidu-
ciary standards? Do the buyers or the sellers owe any obligation to 
the other participants in the enterprise which would restrict them 
in dealing freely with stock in a manner affecting control? 
While few cases have considered these questions, those which 
have decided or discussed the issues suggest negative answers, at 
least insofar as the insider-purchasers' obligations are concerned. 
In cases involving publicly held corporations, the subject has been 
mentioned only in passing, with the suggestion that, despite what-
ever doubts may exist about the use of corporate funds for such 
purposes, individual funds are freely usable. 96 In cases involving 
close corporations, although there are occasional intimations to the 
contrary,07 the purchase or sale of stock to affect the balance of 
control is not generally actionable in suits brought by other stock-
holders, including those against whom the balance has been 
shifted.98 Whatever obligations of disclosure insiders may have to 
96. Mairs v. Madden, 307 Mass. 378, 30 N.E.2d 242 (1940); see Mathes v. Chef£, 
41 Del. Ch. 166, 190 A.2d 524 (Ch. 1963); Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136, 
140 (Ch. 1960); Trevor v. Whitworth, 12 App. Cas. 409,417,436 (1887). 
97. See Kelley v. 74 &: 76 W. Tremont Ave. Corp., 4 Misc. 2d 533, 151 N.Y.S.2d 
900 (Sup. Ct. 1956), modified and afj'd, 3 App. Div. 2d 821, 162 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1957), 
afj'd, 3 N.Y.2d 973, 146 N.E.2d 795 (1957); cf. Opdyke v. Kent Liquor Mart, Inc., 40 
Del. Ch. 316, 181 A.2d 579 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Faraclas v. City Vending Co., 232 Md. 457, 
194 A.2d 298 (1963). 
98. Dacovich v. Canizas, 152 Ala. 287, 294, 44 So. 473, 475 (1907); Guaranty Laundry 
Co. v. Pulliam, 198 Okla. 667, 181 P.2d 1007 (1947); Howell v. McCloskey, 375 Pa. 100, 
99 A.2d 610 (1953); see Yax v. Dit-Mco, Inc., 366 S.W .2d 363 (Mo. 1963); cases collected 
in Annot., 2 AL.R.2d 745, 753-72 (1948); cf. Brown v. Dolese, 38 Del. Ch. 471, 154 A.2d 
233 (Ch. 1959), afj'd, 39 Del. Ch. 1, 157 A.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1960). Boss v. Boss, 200 A.2d 
231 (R.I. 1964), and Dupont v. Dupont, 256 Fed. 129, 175 (3d Cir. 1919) suggests that 
stockholders can vote their stock for the corporation not to buy, in order for them 
to be able to buy personally. Compare King Mfg. Co. v. Clay, 216 Ga. 581, 118 S.E.2d, 
581 (1961); Llewellyn v. Queen City Dairy, Inc., 187 Md. 49, 48 A.2d 322 (1946) (hold-
ing that a corporation has no interest in purchases of its stock by insiders for pur-
poses of acquiring or retaining control); Vulcanized Rubber &: Plastics Co. v. Scheckter, 
400 Pa. 405, 162 A.2d 400 (1960). 
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sellers99 or whatever restrictions their fiduciary role may impose 
upon their freedom to use corporate assets to seek to affect control, 
the governing decisions do not oblige them to refrain from using 
their own assets to enhance or preserve their control status by arm's 
length purchases from third persons. 
Where close corporations are involved, there is a substantial b<J.sis 
for questioning a rule which leaves a fiduciary free to use his own 
funds to affect adversely others' interest in control by buying the 
stock of departing co-venturers. As we have noted, the economic 
interest of the participants in close corporations tends to be con-
centrated in sharing the private emoluments of control, and the 
participants are not free to escape from a control group which they 
dislike or suspect by merely selling their stock in a public market. 
Hence, deprivation of a share in control, or even alteration of pre-
vailing control arrangements, may constitute injury no less sig-
nificant than that which occurs when publicly held corporations are 
operated so as to benefit the insiders at the expense of the public 
investors.100 In such circumstances, it is of doubtful relevance to 
distinguish between insiders' pre-emption of control by purchase 
of stock from third parties and by purchase from the corporation, 
although there is self-dealing in the latter case, whereas there is 
no self-dealing in the former. The interest of the remaining stock-
holders in the preservation of previously prevailing control arrange-
ments suggests a classic conflict of interest for the insider who seeks 
to take advantage of the departure of some participants without 
offering the remaining stockholders an opportunity to share in the 
purchase of the stock of those leaving. Similar considerations may 
affect the seller's freedom to act without offering an opportunity 
to all participants to purchase his stock, whether he is selling a 
block of stock which gives control to one group of existing partici-
pants or selling control to a stranger. Such sales pose a danger to 
the other stockholders which is comparable to the dangers created 
by the sale of control of a public corporation to purchasers who are 
likely to damage the interests of the surviving stockholders. To the 
extent that the seller of stock in a close corporation knows or should 
know the significance of his disposition, there is good reason to hold 
99. See Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Broffe v. Horton, 1'72 
F.2d 489, 494 (2d Cir. 1949); Sher v. Sandler, 325 Mass. 348, 90 N.E.2d 536 (1950); 
Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, '78 HARV. L. REv. 1146 (1965); 
Note, The Prospects for Rule X-JOB-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 
59 YALE L.J. 1120 (1950). 
100. 1 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, 120-21 (1958); Comment, Sales of Corporate 
Control at a Premium: An Analysis and Suggested Approach, 1961 DuKE L.J. 554, 
561-63. 
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him to s~dards comparable to those applied in the sale of control 
of a publicly held corporation.101 Hence, extension of fiduciary 
standards to prevent such shifts of control, even when effected only 
by the use of the insiders' mm resources, seems both fairer and more 
useful than is the present attitude of the courts. 
The "privacy" of the corporation and. the resultant possibility 
that the parties could protect themselves against such alterations by 
making ,:ontractual arrangements do not require a different conclu-
sion. The law of trusts and of agency created fiduciary duties to 
protect beneficiaries against conduct with respect to which the 
settlor or principal might have contracted, but failed to do so. The 
fiduciary relationship among partners, which offers a more apposite 
analogy to the corporate situation,1°2 similarly suggests that the 
participants are not left solely to contractual protection against the 
efforts of one of them to advantage himself over the others. Indeed, 
as we have noted, it is in the case of the close corporation that the 
courts most often prescribe fiduciary protection against the use of 
corporate assets to affect control, although the very privacy of the 
enterprise would have permitted the parties to provide against that 
contingency by contract.103 This is not to say that the stockholders 
of an essentially private venture should be unable to waive such 
protection. But it is to suggest that unless they knowingly do so, 
the freedom of insiders to buy stock in order to acquire or strengthen 
their control in dose corporations should be subject to more restric-
tion than courts have heretofore imposed upon it.104 
In the case of public corporations, however, a different set of 
101. See Low v. Wheeler, 208 Cal. App. 477, 24 Cal. Rptr. 538 (Dist. Ct. App. 
1962); 1961 DUKE L.J. 554, 561-63; cf. Zweifach v. Scranton Lace Co., 156 F. Supp. 384, 
397 (M.D. Pa. 1957). But cf. Lank v. Steiner, 213 A.2d 848 (Del. Ch. 1965). 
102. Compare Kelly v. Delaney, 136 App. Div. 604, 121 N.Y. Supp. 241 (1910), aff d, 
205 N.Y. 618 (1910), with Low v. Wheeler, supra note 101. See also Helms v. Duck-
worth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Funk v. Spalding, 74 Ariz. 219, 246 P.2d 184 
(1952); cf. Conway, The New York Fidudary Concept in Incorporated Partnerships 
and Joint Ventures, 30 FORDHAM L. REv. 297 (1961). Since partnerships are more read-
ily terminable at the will of minority participants than are corporations, the need for 
fiduciary protection against shifts in control in the absence of contract may be greater 
in the corporate case. To the extent that use of the corporate form may restrict the 
contractual freedom of the participants to alter the statutory norms governing cor-
porate operations, there may be further reason for the fiduciary umbrella to be ex-
tended to cover areas against which the parties have failed to contract. In any event, 
the social and economic considerations which seek liquidity or investment freedom 
for stock of public corporations do not preclude deference to fiduciary restrictions in 
assessing the propriety of shifts of control of private corporations. 
103. See notes 14-28 supra and accompanying text. 
104. Stockholder pooling agreements to stabilize control among less than all the 
stockholders present similar, but not identical, problems, as do purchases by one in-
sider of another's stock in order to freeze out a third. Fiduciary considerations also limit 
the validity and enforceability of such agreement. See Bradley, Toward A More Perfect 
Close Corporation, 54 GEo. L.J. 1145 (1966). 
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problems is presented. To be sure, fiduciary ideology shou}d oppose 
a rule which authorizes an insider to alter disadvantageously the 
public stockholders' interest in control or which permits a fiduciary, 
even with his own resources, to buy off some of his beneficiaries, 
thus impeding the others from exercising such rights as they would 
otherwise have to oust him. On the other hand, the public investors' 
economic interest in control is more indirect than that of investors 
in close corporations. We have noted that tliis relative remoteness 
of the public stockholders' economic interest should not leave in-
siders of public corporations any freer than insiders of close corpora-
tions to use corporate assets to alter the voting arrangements so as 
to strengthen their control.105 But a different question arises when 
they use only their own assets or resources. 
The principal significance of the public stockholders' voting 
power is to permit them to participate in determining which set 
of strangers shall manage corporate affairs, and, possibly, which 
general business policies will be followed. Public investors are best 
served when they have a choice in making these determinations. 
But to facilitate such a choice requires rules which leave outsiders 
free to use their own resources to try to acquire the amount of 
stock which they deem necessary to enable or to encourage them 
to contest control. Public stockholders and the other constituencies 
governed by the modem corporation run the risk that outsiders 
whose competence, policies, or integrity they justly suspect can buy 
enough stock to give them control with or without a proxy con-
test.106 On that premise, comparable freedom to acquire stock must 
be available for insiders when they seek to use only their own re-
sources in arm's length transactions to protect or strengthen their 
control. The mere fact that they are incumbents hardly suggests 
that they are less desirable as managers than those who would oust 
them. While the public stockholders may effectively be denied 
choice if insiders buy up enough stock with their own funds to 
preserve their position, the risk of such denial must be taken as 
part of the cost of permitting outsiders to attempt to acquire con-
trolling stock.107 In short, the public stockholders' interest in having 
a choice of management or in the mobility of control is, by defini-
105. See notes 47-50 supra and accompanying text. 
106. See Fenestra v. Gulf Am. Land Corp., 377 Mich. 565, 608, 141 N.W.2d 36, 
55-56 (1966). 
107. The premises on which privately held corporations operate effectively pre-
clude such a choice. There is no public market for their stock, and outsiders are not 
therefore readily able to enter the corporation. Moreover, the participants in a pri-
vately held corporation do not seek a wide choice of managers. They are more likely 
to be interested in the arrangements among those participating than in attracting 
outsiders. 
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tion, subject to such curtailment as others can afford to cause by 
purchasing stock,. So long as outside challengers are not obliged 
to confine their purchases to only enough stock to force the insiders 
to engage in a proxy contest, the fiduciary position of insiders should 
not deny them equal freedom to purchase stock for control pur-
poses; indeed, the interests of the remaining investors in the enter-
prise require that insiders should have such freedom. Assuming 
adequate disclosure,1°8 not the least of the virtues of competition 
between insiders and outsiders seeking control is the option thus 
given to public investors to get out of the enterprise at prices re-
flecting the contestants' optimistic estimates of the value of control. 
If the public investors' interest suggests that neither insiders nor 
outsiders should be categorically precluded from buying up stock 
in the market when competing for control, the question may still 
be asked whether any fiduciary restrictions operate when the former 
buys out the latter in order to retain control. The same considera-
tions that impel facilitating outsiders' legitimate efforts to seek 
control argue against erecting any obstacles to their abandoning 
the pursuit of it. The magnitude of the expense and the scope of 
the difficulties facing those who challenge incumbents for control 
of public corporations needs no elaboration beyond noting that 
those factors undoubtedly account for the infrequency of such chal-
lenges. If any significant restriction were imposed upon the right 
of persons undertaking such a campaign to quit for any reason or 
108. Consideration of the interests of the stockholders who sell to insiders and to 
outsiders buying stock in the market, as distinguished from the interest of the corpo-
ration and its remaining stockholders, suggests some restraints on both insiders and 
outsiders seeking to purchase stock in the market for purposes of control, see note 
99 supra, but poses a host of problems which are beyond the scope of this paper. 
The notion that an insider's bargaining advantages in securities dealings with outside 
investors should be offset by disclosure of relevant facts affecting value when he buys 
their stock may require him to disclose not merely his identity as a purchaser, but 
his purpose to acquire or strengthen his control position, since both his purpose to 
affect control rather than merely to increase his investment and the possibility of 
a contest are relevant facts which will have an impact on the possible price which 
buyers may ask. Similar considerations may apply no less compellingly to the out-
sider who is seeking control, at least at some point in his process of acquisition of 
stock or preparation for a contest, see Hughes v. Treat, 22 S.E.C. 623 (1946), such as 
(a) when he becomes subject to § 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, cf. Chicago 
So. Shore & So. B. R.R. v. Monon R.R., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1964-
66) ~ 91525 (N.D. Ill. 1965); (b) when he acquires 5% of the outstanding stock, see 
S. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); SEC Memorandum to Senate Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency on S. 2731; or (c) when he seeks to solicit proxies, Studebaker Corp. 
v. Allied Prods. Corp., 256 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Mich. 1966). Determining the items of 
information which outsiders or insiders should be required to disclose requires a 
balancing of actualities and possibilities to arrive at a prescription which will neither 
improperly conceal relevant information nor run up the price of the stock on uncertain 
expectancies. And finally, there is the host of problems created by the outsider's deci-
sion to abandon the control contest and sell out on the market at prices which may be 
inflated by reason of prior purchases in preparation for the control contest. 
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at any time, there would undoubtedly be even fewer attempts to 
divest incumbents of control. Whether these considerations justify 
permitting receipt of a premium, if indeed a pr,emium is identifi-
able, 109 by the outsider without his having to account therefor is a 
nice question. To the extent that the "premium" is paid merely 
to enable hm to recoup his investment, it is arguable that such a 
payment should not be discouraged, at least in the absence of evi-
dence that the outsider is selling more than the termination of a 
potential contest over the direction that corporate affairs should 
take. To put the matter in more conventional terms, outsiders sell-
ing out to insiders at a premium may not be sufficiently in a con-
trol position to be held to the fiduciary obligations of those who 
sell control, which includes the actual power to exploit the enter-
prise. The crucial question is, even if outsiders abandoning a con-
trol attempt may freely sell their stock for a higher price per share 
than public investors can receive, should insiders be permitted to 
pay such a premium to procure abandonment of a potential control 
contest? This question invites inquiries comparable to those gen-
erated by the question whether a premium may be received by an 
insider for selling control, even if the answers may not be the same.11° 
B. Sales of Control 
The inquiries are somewhat different here than when insiders 
purchase stock, for the obvious reason that when insiders sell control 
and thus sever their connection with the business, there is lacking 
the concern with its future prosperity which they are likely to have 
when they remain with the enterprise. That difference suggests that 
109. When outsiders purchase stock in quantity in contemplation of a proxy con-
test, the almost inevitable consequence is to raise the market price of the stock. Cf. 
Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Presumably that price, 
although in a sense artificially inflated, does not embody a premium, and sale at 
that price would present no problem. 
110. One basis for the difference may be that the incumbents' retention of control 
leaves the public investors subject to risks of private exploitation by the same persons 
who were in control when they originally invested, whereas sale of control exposes 
them to different, if not necessarily greater, risks of such exploitation. The capitalized 
value of such potential private exploitation is not being sold to strangers, even if 
something is being paid by the incumbents to retain it. Such justification as may 
exist for insisting that all stockholders receive a share of that value when it is sold, 
see note 124 infra, is lacking when it is merely retained. From another point of view, 
insiders may be deemed less likely to have to pay an "excessive" amount as a premium 
to retain their existing control than an outsider would have to pay to buy control, so 
that the likelihood and extent of the enterprise being exploited in order to recoup the 
premium may be less in the former case. Moreover, there may be considerably more 
difficulty in enforcing a rule which either requires the outsider (who has not sold actual 
control) to distribute the premium to the other stockholders, cf. Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. 
Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1963), or in justifying a rule which requires the insider 
to offer to buy all other stock at the price he paid for the outsider's stock. 
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when insiders seek to dispose of control, even more than when they 
seek to preserve it, the remaining stockholders' legitimate interest 
in how control is shifted justifies limiting the insiders' freedom of 
action.111 The extent of these limits has been the subject of ex-
haustive discussion,112 to which little can be added here. 
It may be noted, however, that certain of the notions found in 
the decisions on insiders' use of corporate assets to retain control 
reappear in the discussions of the sale of control. Thus insiders' 
obligations when disposing of stock control require, at a minimum, 
that they not sell out to persons whom they know, or have reason 
to know, will "loot" or "milk" the enterprise.113 This obligation 
reflects the traditional duty of care, which is no less applicable when 
control is sold than when control is exercised in managing the cor-
poration; indeed, it exists whether or not a premium or extra com-
Ill. The stockholder's interest is somewhat different when the insiders are selling 
control in the form of office or directorship than when control is in the form of 
stock ownership. Representational control, alone, is not salable at all because the 
seller doesn't "own" it in any sense. Control resulting from stock ownership (e.g., 
because of the size of the block or because it is coupled with access to the proxy 
machinery) may be sold along with the stock, but the question of restrictions or 
limitations on the seller then arises. See Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of Corporate 
Control, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 628 (1965); cf. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 
(2d Cir. 1962). 
112. Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 
78 HAR.v. L. REv. 505 (1965); Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate Control, 112 U. PA. L. 
R.Ev. 22 (1962); Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of Corporate Control, 50 CORNELL 
L.Q. 628 (1965); Greene, Directors' Surrender of Office for Pecuniary Consideration, 
28 U. CINc. L. R.Ev. 380 (1959); Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARv. L. REv. 
986 (1957); Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. R.Ev. I (1956); Katz, 
The Sale of Corporate Control, 38 CHI. BAR R.Ec. 376 (1957); Leech, Transactions in 
Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 725 (1956); Weisbrod, Trading in Business 
Ownership, 1954 U. ILL. L.F. 465, 477-79; Comment, Sales of Corporate Control and the 
Theory of Overkill, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 725 (1964); Comment, Sales of Corporate 
Control at Premiums? An Analysis and Suggested Approach, 1961 DuKE L.J. 554; 
Note, The Sale of Control: The Berle Theory and the Law, 25 U. Prrr. L. REv. 59 
(1963). 
113. Because the cases invariably involve the receipt by the seller of some special 
reward from the buyer, they do not test the duty of care which exists without regard 
to whether the insider is receiving any special reward. The opinions purport to rest 
on the "fraudulent" conduct of the seller in "conspiring" with the buyer for his 
own benefit, but occasionally they also refer to his negligence or even wilful mis-
conduct, and intimate that his conduct is to be judged by his obligation to exercise 
care without regard to whether he is receiving any special reward and that he is 
liable for the injury caused rather than merely accountable for any premium he 
received. See Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 28, (E.D. 
Pa. 1940); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 652-53 (Sup. Ct.), 30 N.Y.S.2d 755 
(Sup. Ct. 1941); Dale v. Thomas H. Temple Co., 186 Tenn. 69, 208 S.W.2d 344 (1948). 
Compare Bayne, The Sale of Corporate Control, 33 FoRDHAM L. REv. 583 (1965). 
The duty of care is deemed to exist in spite of the fact that the insider may be 
selling not merely corporate office, but a substantial investment interest of his own. 
Possession of control-even if represented by a substantial investment interest-
restricts the freedom of the possessor when he manages the enterprise, and similarly, 
it impairs his freedom to dispose of his own stock because, by reason of its embodying 
control, it is not merely his property. See Berle, supra note 112. 
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pensation is received for such a sale. However, when insiders sell 
control at a premium, they sharpen, if they do not actually create, 
a conflict of interest between themselves and the remaining stock-
holders, so that more than the duty of care or of exercising sound 
business judgment is involved. The conflict between the insiders' 
interest in the premium and the risk to which they subject the 
other stockholders-the risk that the buyer will fail in his conduct 
of the corporate business or will exploit the enterprise for his per-
sonal benefit-activates the fiduciary duty of loyalty as well as the 
duty of care. 
In recent years, the issue has been cast in terms of whether the 
sellers should be required, by analogy to traditional trustees' obliga-
tions, prophylatically to forego the special payment reflected in the 
premium, whether or not harm or likelihood of harm is demon-
strated to result from the sale.114 On the one hand, it has been sug-
gested, by commentators more than by courts that the insiders must 
forego such premiums either by making available to all stockholders 
(including themselves) an equivalent prorated offer115 or by account-
ing for any premiums realized.116 On the other hand, there is the po-
sition which is rooted more in the duty of care than of loyalty 
and which has support among judicial as well as academic author-
ities, that the seller should be accountable only when he has failed 
to exercise appropriate care in the choice of a purchaser, that is, 
when he has sold to a purchaser who he knew, or should have 
known, would be likely to exploit unlawfully the private emolu-
ments of control.117 In short, in dealing with the sale of control at 
a premium as with efforts to preserve control, the notion is that 
the insiders' responsibility should tum on whether the motives 
or intentions of those seeking control are, or are likely to be, 
directed more to the common good than to private exploitation 
of the enterprise and whether the seller has exercised sufficient care 
in ascertaining those motives or intentions. Despite the thoughtful 
prescription recommended for determining whether private advan-
tage is sought or appropriate care in selecting the purchaser is ex-
ercised in any particular case,118 experience with comparable criteria 
for legitimating uses of corporate assets or facilities to preserve con-
114. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 
952 (1955); Krieger v. Anderson, 40 Del. Ch. 363, 182 A.2d 907 (Sup. Ct. 1962); cf. SEC v. 
Insurance Sec., Inc., 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1958). See also authorities cited supra 
note 112. 
115. See Andrews, supra note 112. 
116. See Jennings, supra note 112; Leech, supra note 112. 
117. See Hill, supra note 112; Katz, supra note 112. 
118. See Hill, supra note 112, at 1019-28. 
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trol suggests pointedly that appropriate care will generally be found 
to have been exercised. Indeed, due care probably will be found no 
less often than the exercise of permissible business judgment has 
been found in stock purchase cases.119 However, in traditional fidu-
ciary analysis, the duty of loyalty rather than that of care is the focal 
point of inquiry, and decision would not tum on the fiduciary's 
motivation or on the distinction between "personnel" and "policy"; 
nothing less than the informed consent of the other stockholders 
could justify sale of control at a premium. The question which re-
mains is whether corporate considerations impel dilution of the 
fiduciary norm. 
In answer to that question, it has been suggested that a categor-
ical denial of the premium to potential sellers will erode their in-
centive to transfer control and that, as a consequence, public stock-
holders and the public at large will be injured because discontented 
and inefficient management will remain in control, while aggressive 
and imaginative new forces will be prevented from buying control. 
The argument is that the increased likelihood of transfers of con-
trol resulting from permitting premiums to be received is so bene-
ficial to public stockholders and so independently desirable for the 
economy as to preclude the categorical denial of premiums and to 
justify the risk of occasional unapprehended purchases by persons 
seeking the private emoluments of control. But these propositions 
are not self-evident, even though it may be assumed that a controll-
ing group which has decided that it can find a better investment 
opportunity elsewhere is not likely to offer the enterprise optimal 
management and direction, and although it may be true that to 
permit that group to receive a premium will provide an added 
inducement to sell control. Whether it will induce more than a few 
occasional additional sales than would otherwise occur remains 
largely speculative. So too does the answer to the question whether 
groups which are otherwise satisfied to retain control will be stimu-
lated to sell if they are offered a premium of a size likely to re.fleet 
only sound investment intentions and not the predatory designs 
119. The inability of the courts to distinguish readily between motives of personal. 
gain and motives of public good in such circumstances is illustrated not only in 
the stock purchase cases, but also in the proxy contest cases. There is no reason to 
believe that the courts will be any more skillful or zealously motivated when deal-
ing with the sale of control. Indeed, those commentators favoring a selective pro-
hibition recognize the difficulty of enforcing the distinction, and they conclude that this 
difficulty will leave counsel for a potential seller uncertain and therefore will deter 
sales. To minimize that difficulty, it has been suggested that the burden of proof 
should be allocated in the interest of increasing freedom to sell control. See Hill, 
supra note 112, at 1025-28. 
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of the offeror.120 No empirical evidence, from the business com-
munity or elsewhere, has been offered in support of the benefits 
claimed to result from thus facilitating sales of control. 
To be sure, no such evidence has been offered to the contrary. 
And, in any particular case a buyer may not, merely because he 
pays a premium to a seller, be more interested in private exploitation 
of the enterprise than he is in enhancing its value for the benefit of 
all the investors. However, as the litigated cases suggest and as the 
commentators have pointed out, the likelihood of injury to other 
stockholders from buyers who will seek to recoup their premium, 
or otherwise seek the personal advantages of control, is not remote.121 
It also should be noted that transfer of control may, and not infre-
quently does, disrupt management and, to some extent, operating 
efficiency.122 Therefore, the consequences of such a transfer, even 
without regard to the problem of private exploitation, are not likely 
to be beneficial to the other investors in the enterprise unless the 
purchasing group offers executive and managerial qualities which 
are superior to those offered by the selling group. But the selling 
120. Those questions, it may be noted, are addressed to whether the receipt of a 
premium will increase the likelihood of the seller selling, and not to the nature or 
intentions of the buyers. So far as the buyers are concerned, the necessity to pay a 
premium may-although it need not-stimulate predatory designs. On the other 
hand, a rule which discourages payment of a premium by a buyer to "inside" sellers 
need not discourage buyers, and is not likely to discourage buyers who do not have 
predatory designs. Whatever may be a buyer's talents or motives and whatever may 
be his reasons for paying a premium for a control block of shares rather than buying 
all the stock at market prices, they do not hinge on buying shares only from the 
owner of a control block. The buyer's reasons for buying a control block can be sub-
stantially met by supplying him with a block of shares to which all stockholders have 
been given an opportunity to contribute as well as by allowing him to purchase 
from a single seller. Andrews, supra note 112. To be sure, there will be added ex-
pense and there may be an occasional hitch to a successful tender solicitation, even when 
backed by a firm offer from the holder of a control block, but neither is apt to affect 
significantly the willingness of potential buyers to buy. There may also be some impact 
on a potential buyer's willingness to pay a premium if he knows he will be governed 
by a rule which denies his right to sell freely at a premium. See Comment, Sale 
of Corporate Control, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 869, 872 (1962). But experience does not 
suggest that men who seek to buy control either are motivated by a desire to sell 
it at a premium or would be discouraged by a rule which forbade them from selling 
at a premium-i.e., at a price in excess of the higher market price which they expect 
to create for all the stock. FTC, REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
103-42 (1955). 
121. See Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 581 (2d Cir. 1963) (Friendly, 
J., concurring); Andrews, supra note 112, at 517-45; Jennings, supra note 112, at 
14-19. While buyers who seek to acquire control through market purchases are likely 
in effect to pay no smaller a premium and to have no less a desire to recoup it, 
a market purchase program creates a market in which public investors may sell out 
at a price reflecting the outsiders' estimate of control value. See text accompanying note 
108 supra. Moreover, to the extent that such seekers after control need the assistance of 
public stockholders to wrest control from the incumbents, they will presumably offer a 
program for the conduct of corporate affairs which will appeal to public investors' 
self-interest. 
122. See Andrews, supra note 112. 
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group is under no duty to find or even to seek such a buyer.123 Hence, 
even apart from whether the premium should be shared on the the-
ory that the "asset'' for which it is being paid is an asset belonging to 
the corporation or to all stockholders rather than just to the 
sellers,124 it is difficult to see why rigorous fiduciary standards should 
be diluted when such a dilution may expose public investors to the 
risks connected with sales at a premium. Certainly before diluting 
those standards as substantially as has been suggested, some impera-
tive need for allowing a controlling stockholder to sell at a premium 
should be shmvn, or some empirical evidence should be offered to 
establish that controlling groups are likely to sell out more readily 
to economically desirable purchasers if they are permitted to receive 
a premium, or that there is some over-all social or economic need 
so to encourage transfers of control of publicly held corporations. 
No such evidence has been offered, nor has such a need been demon-
strated. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Because functional considerations do, and should, qualify the 
operation of fiduciary ideology in the corporate field, it has been 
suggested that elimination of fiduciary terminology from the discus-
sion of insiders' obligations might clarify analysis and facilitate the 
application of realistic jurisprudence.125 However, the fiduciary creed 
is itself rooted in functional ground-albeit in somewhat different 
soil for partnerships and close corporations than for publicly held 
corporations. The temptation to abuse the power which a. fiduciary 
is given over the property of others is no less present in corporate 
transactions than in the administration of express trusts. The re-
moteness of the insider from his principals in publicly held cor-
porations as well as the difficulty of measuring the "fairness" or 
"justifiability" of his behavior when he deals with corporate con-
123. Hence, a rule permitting the seller to receive a premium will not increase the 
likelihood of his seeking or finding a desirable buyer. On the other hand, a rule 
requiring a pro rata offer by a buyer would leave a seller with a substantial invest-
ment in the enterprise and therefore make him more likely to examine the qualifica-
tions and intentions of the buyer than he otherwise is required by law to do or is 
likely in fact to do. See Andrews, supra note 112. 
124. See Berle, supra note 112. The elastic scope which the law gives to those in 
control to exploit the enterprise for their private benefit has been noted. See notes 
5 &: 6 supra. It is only when the potential for such exploitation (which insiders 
may be allowed to enjoy unchallenged, if not legitimately, while they are incumbents) 
is capitalized and sold that the public investors have any opportunity to share in 
its proceeds. Such potential is no less a corporate asset because its value is not required 
to be shared prior to its capitalization and sale. 
125. See Kaplan, Conflicts of Interest in Corporations, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
LAW SCHOOL, CONFERENCE ON CONFUCT OF INTEREST (Conference Series No. 17) 34, 
52-54 (1964). 
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trol suggest the kind of inability to police the insider which gen-
erated the prophylactic restrictions on trustees and agents. Hence, 
while relax;:i.tion of such restrictions may be required in the cor-
porate setting, particularly where publicly held corporations are 
involved, a showing of necessity or overriding public interest should 
be a prerequisite to a such relaxation in any particular context. 
Moreover, even when it is thus found necessary or desirable to risk 
occasional unapprehended abuses which the more rigid fiduciary 
restrictions are aimed at preventing, it is not also necessary to adopt 
standards to measure, or sanctions to enforce, "fairness" or "justi-
fiability" which effectively permit such abuses. 
Courts have generally given little or no weight to these consid-
erations when dealing with insider transactions designed to affect 
the control of publicly held corporations, whether the transaction 
involves a corporation's issuance or purchase of its own stock, the 
solicitation of proxies on behalf of management, or the sale of con-
trol. Thus, when the categorical prohibition has been rejected as a 
measure of the insider's duty, courts have tended to place the burden 
of proving unfairness or absence of justification on those who would 
challenge insiders' self-dealing and to measure the propriety of 
insiders' efforts to alter or preserve control for their own advantage 
by relying on the distinction between motives of common good and 
motives of private benefit. Doubtful as may be the validity of the 
need felt by courts or suggested by commentators to relax the more 
rigid fiduciary standards in most of the above contexts, the substi-
tute standards which have been offered are even less defensible. 
They afford no effective protection against conceded, as well as 
likely, abuses by insiders seeking to dilute outsiders' voting power, 
to enhance their own power, or to realize on the value of control. 
